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FA (STANDARDS: LAWS)  AND  MEANING CHANCES 
IN  CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 
I. Introduction 
The orthodoxy is that Chinese characters (1)have more meanings 
and ( 2 )change meanings more frequently than words of other languages. 
One example is  that of fastandarddaws.The usual view is that the character 
means standard or to model for Early Confucians, Mohists, and Daoists, 
but for those called Legalists (and perhaps for Xunzi) it means laws. The 
paradigms of the legal use are Han Feizi and Shang Yang. Traditionally, 
Chinese accounts called them fa-jiaScho0loffa, asand we translate that 
'Legalist'. Typical meaning-change hypotheses tie such meaning changes 
to schools, times, and sometimes simply to particular thinkers or textual 
tokens. 
Using the fa"andards:'awsexample, I hope to reduce the allure of these 
familiar meaning-change claims in general. I believe they are endemic 
largely because the "translation paradigm" dominates Sinology. Simply 
put, we assume that in classes and with dictionaries and grammar books, 
we learn how to read (translate) Chinese. (We tend to learn Chinese 
grammar as a set of algorithms for translating correctly.) Then, armed 
with this prior, independent knowledge of meaning, we tackle the texts 
and come to discover what Chinese thinkers believed. The paradigm 
encourages us to think of translation as objective, disciplined, and basic. 
Interpretation-the theory of what philosophers believed-is by con- 
trast speculative, subjective, and undisciplined. These attitudes coexist 
(surprisingly) with the platitude that the correct translation depends on 
Chinese characters having the same meaning as the translation term. It 
also survives our latent awareness that interpretation is equally about 
meaning and that meaning claims can be as controversial as belief 
claims. 
A. Abstract. I will reject the translation paradigm and appeal to philo- 
sophical analyses of meaning and interpretation. In section 11, Iwill reflect 
briefly on the issues that have driven recent developments in the philo- 
sophical understanding of meaning (I1 A), and show how interpretative 
theory links it to belief; truth, and reason. In II B, I will argue that implicit 
purposes of doing interpretative theory using these concepts together 
justify using meaning-change hypotheses only sparingly in interpretation. 
This will lead us to an account, in I1 C, of what we should require of 
someone who claims that such a meaning change has taken place. 
Finally, in I1 D, I will explain how the orthodoxy came to the view that 
Chinese meanings are particularly fluid. 
Then I will look at the particular example of fastandard"laws. I will argue 
in section Ill that advocates of the claim that fa changes meaning for the 
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so-called Legalists have not met their argumentative burden. The crucial 
element of that burden is elaborating and testing the "null hypothe-
sis"-that produced by a meaning-constancy assumption. In section IV, 
I will spell out the implications of the claim that fa means law, and in 
section V explain in detail the original philosophical role of fastandards. Then 
in VI and VII, I will look at the background and detail of Han Feizi's 
theories. There I will argue that a consistent-meaning approach explains 
Han Feizi's crucial doctrines better than a meaning-change analysis does. 
II. Against Meaning-Change Hypotheses 
Consider the specific challenge to  prove the case that the meaning 
of fa changes. We cannot point to a character's meaning-only to the 
character itself. We cannot point to a term's reference-only t o  the 
term and its context. Briefly, we see the character in spatial relations to 
other characters in the text. (In a living language, we could more easily 
appeal t o  the physical context.) We have a textual theory that sets this 
text among other texts. The textual theory gives each a nearly contem- 
poraneous (and sometimes sequential) dating. How do we get from this 
data to claims about meaning and belief? 
Normally we explain some texts as a whole by saying that they 
express a theory of law. In that interpretative claim, we are using a local 
concept-law. We treat the character as the central one in their expres- 
sion of a theory roughly like one of ours. The standard version of the 
orthodoxy thus asserts that Legalists are Legalists because they advocated 
a political strategy based on something resembling a positivist legal the- 
0ry.l It assumes a conflict between law and morality. It analyzes laws as 
the ruler's promulgated, general commands, which count as duties only 
because he threatens retributive punishment. 
Now the question will be: how much of the evidence for the claim 
that they advocate the doctrine depends on the orthodox theory of the 
meaning of the character fastandard"'aws? . Wh  at is the evidence that Han 
Feizi is a legal positivist? He talks a lot about fastandards:'aws-for example, 
he contrasts fa"andards:'aws and prefers fa"andard"'aw: But we notice nd liritua',
that Mohists and Daoists also talk about fastandard"'aw"' nd oppose liritua'. 
If at this point the orthodoxy asserts that they use fa in the sense of 
standards, the circularity sets in. How do we know that Han Feizi uses it 
in a different sense-in the sense of law? Because he is a legal positivist? 
If the main evidence that he is a legal positivist is his use of fa in the legal 
sense, and the main evidence that he used fa in the legal sense is his 
being a legal positivist, the circularity is complete. Use of this character 
signals the new doctrine only if we accept the orthodoxy's meaning- 
change hypothesis. 
The translation paradigm short-circuits our natural suspicion by di- 
vorcing translation and interpretation. Then its theory of the epistemic 
order, nature, and value of the two separate activities further disguises 
the circularity. If we treat translation as prior, objective, disciplined, and 
strict, then we can treat the presence of the doctrine of legal positivism 
as a genuine discovery. Only those who have learned how to translate 
can appreciate the discovery. Those who reject the discovery fail to 
understand that Chinese characters have many meanings, and that here 
the author used this character in the sense of 'laws'. All "competent" 
translators know this and know to translate it here as 'law.' 
Suspicion arises when we notice that translators must simultane- 
ously allege both the meaning change and associated belief. They sup- 
port the attribution of belief, however, by then treating the changed 
translation as the "plain meaning" of the text. Sticking to "strict" trans- 
lation signals decent respect for the "authenticity of the text." Thus, the 
translation paradigm treats translation as coming before interpretation. It 
paints interpretation (the attribution of belief) as speculative and undisci- 
plined while treating translation as objective, disciplined, and compara- 
tively straightforward. To challenge translation conventions is danger- 
ous. It substitutes subjective, speculative, interpretative reactions for the 
plain fact of what the text says. 
A. The Nature of Meaning. The hint of circularity in this translation model 
has been familiar territory for students of philosophy of language since 
Quine. He based his analysis of the underdetermination of translation on 
this interaction of meaning and belief. We must attribute meanings and 
beliefs together. We can defend multiple attributions of meaning if we 
suitably adjust the beliefs we attribute and vice versa. Given, then, that 
both meaning and belief are nonempirical features of texts, how should 
we go about deciding which pairing is correct? 
Davidson developed the deconstructive hint in Quine that reverses 
the translation paradigm's familiar order. The test of any paired assign- 
ment must start with the beliefs, not the meanings. The meaning theory 
that generates the beliefs that pass the test is the correct theory of 
meaning. 
Davidson's point reminds us of another feature Quine introduced 
into our understanding of meaning-semantic holism. Our attributions 
of belief (therefore, also, of meaning) depend on how we assign meaning 
to all the other characters in the texts. We look for a system of meaning 
assignments that, given the order in the texts, produce belief assignments 
that passed some test. 
Perhaps part of the motivation for focusing on belief assignments is 
this: unlike meaning assignments, we have a test ready at hand for beliefs 
-truth. The kinds of tests we might propose for grading meaning assign- 
ments directly and piecemeal (for example, similarity to our own, famil- 
iarity, elementariness, or primitiveness) all seem intellectually dubious. Chad Hansen 
Furthermore, choosing the meaning-belief assignment that en-
hances the truth of these beliefs captures our implicit, intuitive practice. 
Seeing the writings as true has notoriously been one way of "making 
sense" of them. An important theoretical advantage of the "principle of 
charity" buttressed the case for it. We could more easily think of inter- 
pretative theory as an explanatory theory. Something caused the beliefs 
we find in the texts. True states of affairs cause us to have the beliefs we 
have. 
However, the principle of charity also presented equally well known 
problems. Critics had challenged the implicit confusion of understanding 
and agreeing with. A truth-based standard favors interpretations that 
made ancient, exotic thinkers agree with us, now. We are naturally sus- 
picious of the popular interpretations of classical Daoism that "make 
sense" of it by making it assert quantum mechanics and special relativity 
theory. Beyond showing that the beliefs our assignment yields are true, 
we need to show that they are truths that are plausibly accessibleto the 
writers of these texts. 
So, thinking of interpretation in explanatory terms undermined the 
principle of charity. It is not simple truth that causes human belief. A 
cluster of psychological mechanisms explains belief in humans. These 
mechanisms include sense organs, inheritance of belief, inference from 
other beliefs, argument and agreement, and social pressures. Philosoph- 
ical "truths" particularly worry us. They are deliberately remote from 
mundane truths about medium-sized animals and plants, accessible to 
anyone with normal human sense organs. Ethical truths raise related 
problems, and, as Quine had shown, even the allegedly mundane truths 
turn out to be problematic. Mere sensation cannot tell us to choose a 
meaning-belief assignment that says there is a rabbit out there rather 
than a piece of rabbit-stuff, an instance of rabbit-hood, a sequence of 
rabbit stages, or a collection of rabbit parts. 
These reflections led many to alter the test and to embrace what 
Grandy (1973) called the principle of humanity. Here the standard for 
ranking meaning-belief assignments is not the truth of the resulting be- 
liefs, but their psychological explainability. How good an explanation 
does the assignment offer for the writers' having arrived at the beliefs our 
assignment ends up attributing to them? One obviously important prop- 
erty of the body of beliefs given the principle of humanity is rational 
coherence. A natural way humans arrive at beliefs is by harmonizing and 
developing them from other beliefs they hold. Roughly, then, the princi- 
ple of humanity says to promote coherence rather than truth (for the 
interpreter). 
Focusing on these central interpretative concepts underlined the 
conceptual interaction of meaning, belief, truth, and reason. It has also 
generated skepticism about the entire cluster. Skeptical treatments of Philosophy East & West 
meaning had already begun with Quine; Stitch and Churchland have 
doubted the scientific respectability of belief Truth has been under at- 
tack since Wittgenstein (some would say Dewey), and reason has joined 
the ranks of suspicious concepts we allegedly spread on the world rather 
than read off it (Stitch, Cibbard). I have doubted in print that any similar 
cluster of concepts functions in pre-Buddhist Chinese t h o~gh t . ~  
In the context of such doubts, I do not propose to treat meanings as 
determinate entities that resist change. Besides presupposing that mean- 
ings are real, that also would require settling the puzzle of what they are. 
Instead, I shall argue for a normative conclusion. In doing interpretative 
theory, we should be sparing in proposing such meaning changes. This 
normative conclusion derives from an analysis of the purpose of interpre- 
tative theory. Meaning and belief play complementary roles in achieving 
that purpose. So, in what follows, I shall remain neutral on whether 
meaning and belief are scientifically viable natural kinds and on which 
meaning theory is correct. 
Still, I shall continue to use the cluster of terms. For all our doubts, 
we do not yet have a settled, scientifically respectable alternative to 
meaning-belief theory. In any case, we are assessing a claim put forward 
in the traditional terms-that the Chinese character fa changes mean- & 
ing. We can only address the substance of that claim by attending to the 
existing norms for the use of our existing terms-even if we suspect we 
shall someday abandon them. 
We can still use the spirit of the principle of humanity and its implicit 
technique of exploiting a rough analogy to ourselves. That does not 
mean we have to treat those we translate as having beliefs, far less as 
having the concepts 'meaning' and 'belief'. We simply suppose them to 
be in states roughly like those we are in when we routinely attribute 
beliefs to ourselves. Similarly, we shall not rely on any detailed account 
or theory of reason or coherence. We shall simply attend to what would 
make sense for someone who starts with a set of beliefs to add to that 
set. 
On the same rough analogy to ourselves, we can ask under what 
conditions they might come to adopt new beliefs, to doubt things they 
earlier believed, and so forth. Possibly, the standards of what would 
"make sense" might change. As our theory develops, what makes sense 
may change in complicated ways. We could not now predict those ways 
simply on analogy to ourselves. We only assume that we could eventu- 
ally understand and make sense of the connections among beliefs. We 
assume only that humans share the ability to learn the languages of 
other humans. 
In arguing that we should use meaning-change clairr~s sparingly in 
our interpretative theories, I am claiming that those who propose such 
theories owe us further explanation. I will also try to spell out the general Chad Hansen 
content of the explanation, drawing on the implicit purposes we exhibit 
in using the interpretative language of meaning and belief. We should 
rely on meaning-change hypotheses sparingly because they undermine 
our purposes in doing interpretations. We can explore these purposes by 
looking at various theories of meaning without endorsing any particular 
one. We simply attend to what I will call the "good making character- 
istics" of various theories. Those features we cite and accept as favor- 
ing one theory against its rivals reflect the explanatory purpose of a 
meaning-belief theory. We can thus identify the purpose without decid- 
ing which theory is the best. 
B. The Purpose of Meaning-Belief Theory. So far, of course, I have not 
explained why the meaning-belief link should favor meaning stability. 
Nor have I said why the translation paradigm inclines to the meaning- 
change claim. A traditional dictionary could in principle have contained 
only one English word for each Chinese term. We could combine a 
Quine view that interpretation attributes meaning and belief together 
with a thoroughly wanton ascription of meanings to terms. 
All we have noted so far is that to attribute a meaning to a term is 
simultaneously to attribute beliefs to its members. We can adjust any 
meaning assignment to the facts of usage by changing our account of 
what the speakers believe and vice versa. Thus, Quine argues, no fact of 
usage can prove that one meaning-belief complex is more "correct" than 
another. If you adopt any one of them and assume the corresponding 
beliefs you can communicate fully with native speakers. 
Quine, for example, could say that the expression "gor dhi ngraw 
xoo jrukshynn" (those oxen are ugly) means "the grass is green" (since 
oxen are usually around grass). Then, when someone at dimsum says, 
"cearng srik ngraw paakjrip" (have some beef tripe), he could choose 
between saying two things: (1)the term in that context now means beef, 
or ( 2 )the speakers had an elaborate belief about how eating beef tripe is 
indirectly eating grass. There are simply too many ways of matching 
statements to truths if we allow meaning-change hypotheses. This is the 
kind of consideration that led Quine to conclude that no fact settles 
meaning claims. No meaning facts underlie our attributions of meaning. 
Davidson's corrective emphasizes that the theory attributing mean- 
ing should do so systematically. It should assign meaning to expressions 
in ways that reflect their grammatical structure. This favors interpreta- 
tions that do not freely alter meaning in every different use or context. 
We strive to find a meaning that fits the system of the language and 
explains all the uses and references of a term. 
We have already noticed that Davidson's approach gives us a basis 
for rating some assignments as better than others. We also can motivate 
it on causal-explanatory grounds-as we did the principle of humanity. Philosophy East & West 
A language that worked in the way we envisioned above would be 
humanly unlearnable. We can explain how humans learn the meaning of 
their sentences only if the semantic rules trace the syntactic ones. Then 
the speakers of the language could construct, predict, and understand 
grammatical combinations they had not met with before. A language 
that did not have that feature would not be rational in my loose sense. It 
would not make sense to beings with our particularly human combina- 
tion of mental abilities and limits. 
The point is not that we can neatly separate meaning and belief. The 
point, rather, is that we attribute both to a population as a combined 
strategy to explain all their communication in context. The explanation 
will be better if we can give a constant theory of meaning to explain 
different uses. It will not merely be more elegant, simpler, and more 
plausible. It will have more explanatory power. When we strive for mean- 
ing stability, we achieve that implicit purpose of doing interpretative 
theory better. We attribute a complex of meaning and belief to the 
speakers in ways that explain the links between the uses of the term in 
different grammatical, physical, and conversational contexts. 
Still another theory favoring stable meanings comes from the Straw- 
sonian tradition. If we distinguish between a word and the use of a word 
(a word type and a word token), then we might explain meaning and 
referenceluse as follows. We say that a word type has a meaning. In 
virtue of the word type's meaning, the word token refers to contextually 
appropriate objects and thus contributes to the statement token's truth. 
Thus, we shall think of tokens of a word as referring to specific objects, 
but not, qua token, as having a meaning. The word type, by contrast, will, 
qua type, have no reference but have a meaning-its potential to refer 
to this or that in context. To refer, we must use the word in some 
contextual statement. 
Thus, we prefer not to say that the meaning changes with each 
different use in which reference changes. The salient examples here are 
indexicals. The word "I" refers to a different individual when used by 
different individuals. That is a property of the word type. We should want 
to say that the meaning is the same for all English speakers and uses. That 
shared meaning of the word type explains why specific word tokens, 
utterances by different people in different situations, refer to this or that. 
The causal or historical theory of meaning has dominated recent 
philosophical discussion. It gives a slightly different account of the rela- 
tion of meaning and belief. This, therefore, is another good place to look 
for the implicit purposes of doing interpretative theory. Its chief feature 
is that in place of identifying a meaning with a descriptive phrase (a 
definition in, say, English or an ideographic description in Mentalese), 
causal-historical theory focuses on the coiner. Someone first used the 
word to refer to some object. She intended the word to apply rigidly to Chad Hansen 
that type of object. Those who learn the term from that original coiner 
typically both intend and strive to refer to the same type. This ties mean- 
ing, the causal theorist argues, to that actual type, not to what the 
speakers believe about it. 
Causal theorists urge this analysis especially for "natural kind" terms 
--grizzly bear, oak, hydrogen, and atom. Causal analysis has one advan- 
tage over any descriptions analysis: we can make sense of intellectual 
progress. Once we believed that dolphins were fish. We now know they 
are mammals. On causal analysis, neither the term 'fish' nor the term 
'mammal' has changed meaning. The change was in our substantive 
scientific beliefs, not in semantics. The term "rigidly designates" the type 
even when our beliefs about that type change in basic ways. 
The advantage that causal theorists appeal to is that this approach 
makes intellectual progress intelligible. We can make sense of discover- 
ing that we were wrong in our past beliefs. We once thought a sunrise 
happened when the sun moved through the sky. Now we think it hap- 
pens because the earth revolves. We once thought the earth was a flat 
expanse of land surrounded by water; we now think of it as round. The 
meanings of 'earth', 'sun', and 'sky' have not changed, but our beliefs 
about them have. 'Sunrise' still refers to the same event-type, but it does 
not describe that event as we now understand it. 
Rival "descriptivist" theories implicitly treat any key change in our 
view of a type as a change in meaning. Descriptivist theories, conse-
quently, make intellectual progress problematic. As some Kuhnians have 
argued, if a word's meaning is a theoretical description, then we cannot 
unproblematically claim that Einstein's physics is an advance on New- 
tonian physics. They simply "define" 'mass' differently so that there is no 
neutral statement of any question that Newtonian physics answered 
wrong and Einstein's physics got right. The theorists of different times are 
simply speaking different languages. They do not really disagree. The 
appearance that the two theories conflict is illusory. So, too, is the ap- 
pearance that our knowledge has increased. We have simply changed 
languages and the two beliefs are incommensurable. 
The positivist tradition was one target of causal theorists. It, too, had 
tried to deal with the stability of meaning and avoid these problems with 
a descriptivist account. This used the theory of contextual definition. We 
can give the meaning of a term without giving an explicit formula or rule 
for its use. We simply give a rule for substituting other terms in different 
contexts and thus show how to "eliminate" the term. Giving the substitu- 
tions together with the rules that trigger them in contexts is giving our 
theory of the meaning of the term. This implicitly treats the meaning as 
more general and more stable than the particular uses. 
The causal theory also purports to correct endemic mistakes in more 
traditional Western semantic theories. Western folk theory of meaning Philosophy East & West 
treats meaning as an intrinsically representational mental item-the 
Mentalese description. This, notoriously, makes all communication para- 
doxical. Each of us arguably has a different mental construct for each 
English word. Meaning, on this traditional analysis becomes private and 
subjective and the appearance of communication an illusion. The con- 
ventional analysis joins the causal analysis in both these conclusions. If 
meaning is a convention, then it is public. Individuals may get the con- 
vention wrong, but they do not change it by misunderstanding. Conven- 
tions also have a certain stability through time-though perhaps not as 
"rigid" as that envisioned by the causal theory. 
The descriptive theory or the commonsense ways of speaking that 
blur meaning and belief also block any chance of successful communica- 
tion between parties who disagree. In ordinary speech, we say "For Men- 
cius 'morality' means something internal, and for Xunzi it means some- $% 
thing external." This uses the word 'means' to talk about their different 
theories. That claim says the same thing as "Mencius believes morality is 
internal and Xunzi believes it is external." It seems a positive feature of 
theories like the causal and conventional meaning theory that they keep 
meaning and belief claims more distinct than this. People can use the 
meaning conventions to state different and even conflicting beliefs. 
The point remains even when the beliefs in question are beliefs about 
the meaning (definition) of the term in question. The causal theory re- 
minds us to treat even different philosophers' deliberate definitions as 
merely rival theories of the same subject matter. The subject matter is 
the term's meaning. On the causal analysis, that meaning is the object's 
essence. On the conventionalists' analysis, it is the unformulated but 
public conventions governing use of the word. 
Disputing rivals use the same word in conducting their debate, and 
they assume it has a common meaning for them both. They disagree 
either about the analysis of that term or about the essence of the type 
to which it refers. Each assumes that one of them is  wrong about some 
objective matter. (Each usually assumes that, in particular, his rival is 
wrong.) A philosopher's definition does not settle this issue. It merely 
gives his view on it.Such pronouncements do not fix the meaning of our 
terms. 
Our linguistic competence is our mastery of our linguistic commu- 
nity's conventions. Those conventions settle what his words refer to, not 
my pronouncements about the word. If he says, "by 'nature,' I mean 
whatever occurs during life," he may be right or wrong. Even if he an- 
nounces it as a firm resolve to use the word that way, he may or may not 
successfully conform to that resolution. Even if he does, it could not 
change what any of his pronouncements strictly means. It effectively 
conveys his intention to say something else and thus helps us under- 
stand his point. His new theory may eventually become common belief Chad Hansen 
and thus part of the inference potential of the term. We will consider this 
result below when we talk about how meanings do change. 
The important point here is about our implicit purposes in advancing 
meaning-belief theories. We seek to understand the language-based 
interactions in a linguistic community. We notice that members of a 
community sometimes debate. They disagree-have different beliefs. We 
more naturally explain that interaction by saying that they use the same 
word with the same meaning and disagree in their beliefs. We also say 
their beliefs change over time. A sufficiently stubborn "radical" Quinian, 
however, could instead offer a translation manual in which A and B 
simply speak distinct subdialects. The appearance of a debate, she would 
say, is illusory. They are simply not communicating. 
Recall that a similar problem plagued the early versions of ethical 
Emotivism. Naturalists criticized it for making the appearance of substan- 
tive moral debate a mistake. Emotivists themselves took Emotivism to 
entail that disputants misled themselves when they thought they were 
having a substantive moral discussion. They falsely assumed that one of 
them was right and one wrong. They assumed there was a separate 
moral fact that makes one right and the other wrong. 
Naturalists had an easy counterattack. Your analysis of the meaning 
of moral terms cannot be correct if it so drastically alters our conception 
of what we are doing in moral debate. It suggests that no one in the 
community of moral advocates understands the moral terms. If they did, 
they would stop debating. We normally assume that the bulk of native 
speakers do understand such simple terms. Therefore, it clearly is part of 
the meaning (inference potential) of 'moral' that getting the right answer 
is a reasonable aim of discussion. The conventions of the group underly- 
ing the use of these terms include that they take reasonable debate of 
the ethical matters seriously. 
We object to using meaning change liberally in interpreting Chinese 
philosophy on similar grounds. If meaning changes whenever theory 
changes, then the two schools or writers are simply not communicating. 
Technically, they are not using the same language. Once they under- 
stand that they are speaking different languages, they will see that they 
have no real disagreement and cease to waste time in discussion. 
Their belief that they are really disagreeing is an illusion-declares 
the interpreter. The problem is not merely the interpreter's implicit arro- 
gance in assuming he understands the language better than the partici- 
pants. His stance prevents us, now, from being able to make sense of the 
debate. That is because his position amounts to the claim that the de- 
bate really makes no sense. He abandons one of the purposes for which 
we make a meaning-belief distinction in interpretative theory. 
Of course, sometimes there are such breakdowns in communica- 
tion. The point is that they are breakdowns, not the normal case. In the Philosophy East &West 
normal case, we hold meaning constant and allow for differences in 
belief. This is the more systematic, elegant, natural way to explain the 
community's speaking and writing. We should, thus, construe meaning 
broadly, abstractly, and generally enough to underwrite most of the 
existing views in the community. We should not treat all disagreement as 
differences in meaning, thus making rival factions speak different lan- 
guages. The meaning makes possible (and possibly productive) the activ- 
ity of debate, of discussion, and of disagreement. It maintains the com- 
munity as the beliefs change. 
Both parties in the debate assume that the reasons they give for their 
beliefs are good reasons-better reasons than those given by their rivals. 
Still, we can safely assume that they can recognize and respond to the 
rival reasons. The rivals produce reasons we can recognize as germane 
and deserving response. We engage in the debate because we think that 
we can each recognize and weigh the force of the reasons for rival 
beliefs. Thus, one productive way to analyze "knowing the meaning" is 
to be "able to appreciate what the community recognizes as reasons for 
different beliefs." The terms of debate pick out the subject matter and 
underwrite all the reasons a community might give and recognize as 
pertinent considerations for rival beliefs and for expanding beliefs. 
My strategy in this essay is related. Rather than try to decide which 
meaning theory is correct or what the nature of meaning is, I focus on 
what we recognize as reasons in favor of each. Then I use those consid- 
erations to locate our implicit purpose in attributing meaning and belief. 
We take our recognition of reasons favoring a theory as a good guide to 
our intuitive understanding of the point of making a meaning-belief dis- 
tinction. We respond to the implicit purposes that launched meaning 
theory in Western philosophy. We want to explain the system and detail 
about a community's use of a term.3 
All the theories make meaning more stable-something we can 
use to explain other changes in the functioning of language. The other 
changes explained include changes in reference, belief, or traditional 
translation. Here both the causal and conventional theory point to their 
superior ability to explain communication through time, across speakers 
or schools, and through normal advances in theory. These theories con- 
trast with a commonly recognized failing of traditional meaning theory. 
That theory, enshrined in some familiar ways of speaking, makes mean- 
ing so subjective it makes communication and mutual understanding 
enigmatic. 
In sum, reflecting on the purpose of attributing meaning, we see that 
we cannot achieve that purpose when we wildly attribute change in 
meaning. To resort to meaning change claims is to give up the goal of 
explaining normal, successful conversation and interaction. This does not 
mean we can never do it. We would entertain such changes when we Chad Hansen 
have good reason to conclude that normal communication has broken 
down, for example when we can find no way to make sense of the 
exchange or intellectual development. We cannot justify the claim that 
meaning has changed simply by citing a change in reference, a difference 
in use, a dispute within the community, or an advance in knowledge. We 
achieve our normal explanatory purpose better when we represent these 
normal occurrences against a background of linguistic continuity. Mean- 
ing change is a departure from that norm, and when we postulate one, 
we owe a substantive showing that claiming such a departure is justified 
-the burden of proof is on the meaning-change theorist. 
C. Mechanisms of Meaning Change. Again, we have not argued that 
meaning cannot change. In fact, each of the theories entails that mean- 
ing does change in certain situations and in certain ways. Obviously, the 
causal theory presents language as having much more constant meaning 
than does Traditional Western theory. It does, however, recognize mean- 
ing change. Normally, we succeed in referring as our teachers do. When 
we fail, our teachers or other speakers normally correct us. The typical 
explanation of a breakdown for the causal theory is an embedded mis- 
take. These mistakes are common; people do misuse words. However, 
the usual pattern is that others in the linguistic community notice, criti- 
cize, and correct the mistake. It does not change meaning unless it 
somehow survives this normal process and gets embedded in a tradi- 
t i ~ n . ~The same causal mechanism that explains meaning can, thus, ex- 
plain meaning change. Opinion leaders' mistakes embed themselves. The 
community so respects or fears the person who first makes the mistake 
(he may be the leader of a school, or someone politically ruthless) that 
they emulate rather than correct him. 
Conventions also change. They may change in a similar way-as 
conventional perpetuation of a mistake in some earlier convention. They 
normally, however, occur gradually as accumulations of original or elab- 
orating extensions of existing conventions. These changes will be almost 
imperceptible to the participants. Even external observers will only notice 
them after considerable accumulation. 
The intimate interrelation of meaning and belief also carries implica- 
tions for meaning change. I noted above the leeway we normally grant 
individuals to depart from conventions in metaphor as well as provision- 
ally to employ controversial stipulative definitions. Granting such leeway 
figures in another way that meaning actually does change. The meta- 
phorical expression can be so engaging that it becomes common-a 
cliche. The metaphor ossifies into conventional use-the process that 
led Nietzsche to describe truth as "dead metaphor." Metaphors get ab- 
sorbed into the conventional ways of speaking. They become part of the 
meaning.Philosophy East & West 
Similarly, once-disputed theories that are presented using arguments 
that depend on controversial stipulative definitions can become widely 
accepted. The conventional inference potential of the term then grows. 
Here we see, in more explicit form, the relation between meaning and 
reasons for belief. One who understands the meaning can follow the 
argument for a position. When the position becomes "conventional wis- 
dom," the inference potential of the term reflects that change. This is 
why it is so easy to slide into the view that to understand the meaning is 
to accept the truth of the natives' beliefs. That would, of course, violate 
our desideratum. Rival theories may both reach their conclusions from 
different stipulative definitions. They can understand and follow each 
other and an audience can follow them both. 
We will be torn about dividing the explanation between meaning 
and belief when theory changes radically enough. When a theory postu- 
lates new theoretical objects, we may begin to use an old word ambigu- 
ously for the old and new objects. Theorists may comment on their 
intended difference and give instructions or pronouncements that signal 
their intention. They draw attention to and distinguish their theoretical 
roles. A stipulative definition helps restrict the word to its new theoretical 
role. If the new theory is successful, the word's new role may eventually 
become its primary role as the old theory disappears. Alternately, as we 
become more aware of the difference, we may start to reserve one term 
for the new role and use what was once a synonym for the original role. 
These are plausible outlines. They illustrate the story we must tell 
along with any argument that meaning has changed. This type of mean- 
ing change will normally occur mainly where (a) the theory relates the 
roles inferentially, (b) no word existed for the newly intended theoretical 
role, and (c) the coiners were ignored or they elided the difference 
in sense or lacked the originality to coin a new word. Theorists may, 
alternately, note the different senses and keep the accepted ways of 
speaking. 
Most clearly, meaning change can come about when we import 
foreign ideologies and translators use existing ideographs to limn key 
terms in the foreign theories. These characters then start to exhibit the 
inferential connections of the alien conceptual scheme. When the im- 
ported theory is far different, the term may come to refer to a different 
type-to the type intended by the coiner of the foreign term. It is in such 
cases that the meaning-change hypothesis is most pla~sible.~ 
The onus, then, that lies on the advocate of meaning-change 
hypotheses is (a) to show that we cannot satisfactorily explain those 
differences in use, reference, or belief as differences tied together by a 
common meaning of a shared language and (b) to specify and explain 
the mechanism by which the meaning change took place. We treat 
meaning-change theories as explanations of failure. The interpreters ad- Chad Hansen 
mit that they cannot explain or make sense of the apparent reasons the 
different factions gave for their positions. We pronounce the participants 
mistaken about the implications of their own language use, about the 
nature and character of their dispute. We allege that communication 
between them has broken down. It is not enough that neither argument 
clearly wins. The failure hypothesis would suggest that they were not 
even able to consider, weigh, or respond sensibly to the arguments given 
by the other side. 
This can, of course, happen, but it is  not the normal case. When we 
see clear evidence of such a breakdown in communication and a com- 
plete failure to connect in debate, we can start to look for some mecha- 
nism of meaning change to explain it. We would meet this onus when we 
show that postulating a breakdown explains the text better and can, 
itself, be explained. First the meaning change must yield a considerable 
explanatory advantage over treating meaning as constant. It must out- 
weigh the normal theoretical, psychological, and conventional reasons 
for the null hypothesis. 
The null hypothesis is the interpretative theory (account of meaning 
and beliefs) that assumes the normal communication conditions to hold. 
It treats meaning as shared among the writers of the same language who 
disagree about philosophical issues. It treats meaning as constant even as 
knowledge progresses and as theory evolves in the community. Arguing 
for a meaning change thus requires at least elaborating the null hypothe- 
sis for evaluative comparison. We must first see how the assumption that 
the term did not change meaning attributes and explains the different 
beliefs in the community through time. Only if we can show that it 
wholly fails to make sense of the texts can we justify the meaning- 
change theory. 
We must, then, show that assuming that the term's meaning did 
change does attribute beliefs to the community that we can plausibly 
explain. This is an unexpectedly high hurdle. In asserting that the mean- 
ing has changed, we have abandoned the right to explain by appealing 
to normal communication and reasoning practices. Unless we rely on the 
details of some mechanism, we have no reason for saying that it changed 
to "this" rather than an infinite range of "thats." Foreign import, extrater- 
restrial visitations, descent from a common language, divine inspiration, 
innate ideas, and so on are among the available (sometimes shockingly 
common) explanation^.^ Such breakdowns are normal. The problem is 
that we lack an account of the "normal" result of such a breakdown. 
After postulating such a breakdown, the meaning we attribute threatens 
to be ad hoc. 
D. The Translation Paradigm and Meaning Change. It remains only to say 
why the translation paradigm has found the theory that Chinese charac- Philosophy East & West 
ters change meaning frequently so tempting. We can trace part of the 
motivation from considerations we have explored above. First, the princi- 
ple of charity, combined with a practical requirement to find an English 
word for the translation in this context, leads quite obviously to different 
English words being used. We thus come to associate each character 
with several different English words. We learn to select different members 
from the list for different contexts. We select the member that produces 
a sentence we find most nearly true or most comfortably familiar. 
Further, it can easily strike us that Chinese philosophers deliberately 
avoid the stereotypical, Socratic move. They seldom ask, "What do you 
mean by X?" Definition simply does not play the central role in Chinese 
philosophical discussion that it did in the Western tradition. Interpreters, 
in reaction, become willing to treat almost anything a philosopher says 
using a term as a definition of that term. This perhaps stems from com- 
bining the conviction that Chinese philosophy is philosophy with a 
traditional conception of Western philosophy. When we add another 
traditional, folk philosophical belief, that meaning is in the private indi- 
vidual mind, we get the conventional conclusion. Each utterance using a 
term becomes what the philosopher successfully means by the term, and 
all his declarations become "true by definition in Chinese." We not only 
satisfy the principle of charity in making them true; we explain their truth 
as analytic. We need only understand that Chinese words change mean- 
ings especially freely. 
We could, however, interpret both these practices in the spirit of 
contextual definition explained above. We could insist that the various 
translations and pronouncements are consistent with a single coherent 
concept. That presents us with a sometimes challenging task of tying the 
alternatives together with some coherent theory of the meaning. I sus-
pect that another feature of our training mitigates against this, however. 
The metatheory of the relation of translation and interpretation avoids 
the conclusion that accepted translation practices enshrine a conven- 
tional interpretative theory. We still try to understand our learning classi- 
cal Chinese on the analogy of learning a living language. (Note the 
endemic fascination among classical scholars with their various unpro- 
nounceable systems, each purporting to capture how ancient writers 
pronounced each character.) Scholars aspire to a state similar to that of 
being a near-native speaker of modern Chinese. Yet, when we learn 
classical Chinese today, we still learn it typically in the form of transla- 
tion strategies. Most "grammarians" of classical Chinese still state their 
"grammar" in the form of translation algorithms. Ancient Chinese linguis- 
tics is marked by more interest in reconstructing ancient pronunciations 
than developing a principled, phrase-structure grammar. 
We cannot, of course, tie classical Chinese to the world via the 
actual relations to the world that comes from living in a community of Chad Hansen 
classical speakers. We cannot learn intuitively to govern our mutual, 
practical relations with their language. We cannot make them seem 
natural to us via their incorporation into our daily social lives. We can 
only "master" the language by treating the conventional translations 
(whether English, modern Chinese, or Japanese) as unquestioned second 
nature. Mastery comes, thus, to require unreflective, credulous accep- 
tance of traditional views of both meaning and belief. 
Thus, we confuse becoming fluent in a conventional interpretative 
theory--at being native speakers of a school of translation-with being 
a native speaker of a language. We blur the valid standard of correct 
language use (endorsement by other speakers) with a specious standard 
of theory choice (endorsement by other theorists). We implicitly treat 
schools of translators as ersatz linguistic communities. To speak a living 
language correctly is to have other native speakers accept our speech as 
normal and interact with us. To know ancient Chinese is to have other 
translators of classical Chinese agree with us. This failed analogy tempts 
us to suppress the sense that the conventional English translations are 
words. We treat the meanings of the separate English words as the sepa- 
rate meanings of the ideograms. I have called this the "English-is-the- 
only-real-language fallacy."' 
Although this partly explains the Western willingness to accept doc- 
trines of meaning change, it does not explain why they are there to be 
accepted in the first place. We do hear such claims from Chinese as well 
as Western scholars. (Of course, the same explanation works for Chinese 
scholars who say such things in English.) The blurring discussed above 
would also have characterized the first encounters of Western mission- 
aries and Chinese scholars. Knowing Chinese would have seemed to 
require accepting the then orthodox interpretative theory of Chinese 
thought-accepting the interpretative views of their living Chinese 
teachers. Indeed, part of the explanation of the orthodoxy that Chinese 
meanings routinely change is an engaging interaction of distinctive fea- 
tures of Chinese and Western ways of talking about language. 
Classical Chinese philosophy did not use concepts such as meaning 
or belief in their theory of language. I will not go into the details of their 
linguistic theory here. Briefly, in the classical Chinese view, all dispute is 
disagreement about the reference, scope, or use of crucial terms. To 
have a disagreement is to use language differently, for different objects, 
and to classify differently. The logic of the interaction of meaning and 
reference, as we saw above, shows that we should avoid translating this 
view as saying that meaning changes between disagreeing parties in a 
dispute. 
This theory of use underlay traditional Chinese dictionary construc- 
tion. Chinese dictionaries, thus, routinely consist of etymologies followed 
by long lists of alternative substitutions. Each gives an example of a char- Philosophy East & West 
acter's use drawn from literature with a substitute character for that 
context. 
What produces the familiar view that Chinese characters have many 
meanings is interpreting this against the background of our Western 
dictionary theory. It centers on the philosophical concept of meaning 
and definition. Each entry seeks to give a distinct rule of use. We trans- 
late the Chinese dictionary practice into a Western dictionary idiom 
(infused with these philosophical notions of meaning, concepts, content, 
and ideas). We tend, thereby, to treat Chinese dictionary practice as 
showing that each character has five to fifty different "meanings." 
When Western scholars found the Chinese theory of their own past 
tradition, Confucian scholars already had several hundred years' history 
of reconstructing and interpreting their tradition. Western translators, as 
we saw above, might confuse learning the current Neo-Confucian con- 
clusions in that project with learning a living language. I will not add 
much detail here to the long debate about the objectivity and reliability 
of those Confucian interpretations. The logical point is that they are 
interpretations. 
Ming or Qing dynasty scholars had an established interpretative tra- 
dition. We adopt an attitude formally like the one we adopt toward prior 
Western interpreters. We mix skepticism with respect for their scholar- 
ship in recognition of the fact that we inevitably draw on their prior work 
in our current theorizing. However, we do not want to confuse learning 
these important interpretative theories with learning a living language. 
We can ask, still, why would the Neo-Confucian project have be- 
queathed these meaning-change conclusions to the interpretative tradi- 
tion they taught Westerners? One possible answer draws again on our 
reflections above. Confucianism resembles both a religion and a political 
party; Confucians are a combination of priests, lawyers, and philoso- 
phers. They do not treat ideological and interpretative issues as detached 
intellectual exercises. They rightly or wrongly view Confucianism as the 
authentic Chinese philosophy, in contrast to Buddhism. For them, as for 
many early Western interpreters, Chinese thought i s  Confucian thought. 
This commitment encourages them to view Confucianism as an in- 
dependent and integral system of thought and practices derived from 
a semidivine founder-Confucius. Confucian interpretative motivations 
are, thus, the obverse of those we have been eliciting from Western 
interpretative practice. They postulate meaning changes for the same 
reasons that Western interpretative theory would avoid them. Postulat- 
ing meaning changes insulates classical Confucianism from its classical 
rivals and from the threat that Confucian conclusions do not follow from 
pure "Chineseness." 
Confucianism prefers the outcome that concludes that Daoists and 
Legalists misused the language, missed the point, and changed the sub- Chad Hansen 
ject. They prefer the conclusion that only Confucius and Mencius under- 
stood the crucial terms of debate. Taking their native critics seriously 
threatens rather than promotes their purpose. Postulating breakdowns in 
communication justifies otherwise sincere and serious scholars in dis- 
missing the criticisms of Confucianism made by contemporary Chinese 
philosophers. They were simply (and erroneously) talking about some- 
thing else! 
The meaning mechanism we have discussed explains how these 
Confucian views came to dominate early Western studies despite long- 
standing natural skepticism about Confucian objectivity. We learn the 
meaning and belief together! When we try to satisfy our teachers that we 
understand the language, we accept their existing beliefs and rationales 
for their interpretation. Asserting that Daoists believe in the mystical, 
metaphysical Dao entails asserting that their use of Dao means "The 
indescribable, Absolute, indivisible creator of heaven and earth and all 
things" and vice versa. The theories that Han Feizi is a legal positivist and 
that fastandard' means laws in his writings do not rest on some neutral, 
independent ground. They support each other. 
No conscious, deliberate distortion explains this result. Habit and 
learned beliefs drive this translation practice more than conscious re- 
flective design. Still, the unnoticed interplay of meaning and belief 
assumptions gives us good reason to set aside the otherwise reasonable, 
conservative principle of accepting existing theory. It is rational on the 
assumption that a reliable process produces the community consensus. 
When the sole valid reason given for the consensus is that it is the 
consensus, the principle loses its appeal in theoretical matters. Advo- 
cates of meaning-change hypotheses cannot appeal to existing transla- 
tion practice to meet the burden of proof. 
In the particular case of fa"andards:'aw', Iwould argue that the meaning 
did change-a century later. The mechanism was the importation of a 
foreign idea system and the appropriation of fagandards as one common 
translation for 'dharma'. Neo-Confucians looked back at their own classi- 
cal tradition through the lens of six hundred years of Buddhist intellectual 
domination. Westerners found the Indo-European concept to be close to 
their own familiar commonsense notion of law or principle. The modern 
discovery, associated especially with Creel, was that fa had also meant 
'standards'. Psychologically and epistemologically, the 'law' translation 
lies deeper in our consciousness. 
In summary, the reasons for distinguishing meaning, use, belief, and 
reference are that they play different, interrelated, roles in the structure 
of an explanatory, interpretative theory for a language. Together they 
help us explain meaningful disagreement within a linguistic community 
and the variety of reference and use. They enable us to explain meaning- 
ful intellectual progress over time. These explanatory purposes suggest a Philosophy East & West 
policy of postulating meaning change sparingly and only when we find 
evidence of the mechanisms of meaning change. We should not resort 
to meaning-change claims whenever we find differences in expression, 
reference, or belief. Doing so undermines the attempt to explain intellec- 
tual progress in the normal way. 
These considerations apply even when the debate is about the 
meaning of the term itself. When philosophers appear to offer what we 
might identify as explicit definitions or theories of what their term means, 
we should take the contextual implication seriously. They and their philo- 
sophical rivals disagree about something. Neither disputant becomes 
right simply by announcing his theory. Both think they are giving an 
account of the objective, public character, not of their subjective, idio- 
syncratic reaction to it. Even when a writer announces an apparently 
sincere resolve to use a word according to some explicit formula, we 
need not assume that he succeeds. He will have the same difficulty that 
we all do in detaching ourselves from our lifelong training in the public 
conventions of language use. 
Positively, we meet the burden by comparing the null hypothesis to 
the suggested meaning change. The change should result in a clear ex- 
planatory advantage in accounting for the resulting beliefs. It must be a 
significant enough explanatory advantage to outweigh the implicit impli- 
cation of a breakdown in normal communication practice. The advocate 
should supplement that comparison result with some explanation of the 
mechanism of meaning change. She should show how the error was 
made and why it persisted in the face of the normal mechanisms of 
meaning preservation. Simple appeal to an alleged consensus of trans- 
lators or tradition of interpretation cannot justify meaning-change 
hypotheses. 
Ill. A Survey of Arguments for the Falaw Meaning-change Hypothesis 
Have any arguments for the meaning-change hypothesis applied to 
fa met this burden? Deliberate, explicit argument, as I have complained, 
is rare. The norm is to state meaning claims as if they were empirical 
observations for those who "know" Chinese. Three recent writers span 
the range of current theories of the term fastandards. All accept the ortho- 
doxy that f d s  meaning changes. One position emphasizes the law sense 
and expresses reservations about Creel's standards analysis, even for the 
early thinkers. The second approach emphasizes the standards analysis 
and the meaning change to law as a minor adjustment. The middle 
position takes the meaning change at full value. It treats the two mean- 
ings as independent and the change as a real, localizable, and significant 
meaning event. 
Schwartz accepts Creel's view that 'laws' is "often highly mislead- 
ing''' and offers to "consider its many semantic extensions." He actually Chad Hansen 
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gives an elaborate and insightful statement of the 'standards' meaning: 
"a prescriptive method or techne designed to describe the rules of a craft 
or political techniques designed to control social beha~ior."~ Still, he 
insists, "It still remains possible that in i t s  original meaning, the word fa 
may have referred to penal law and it is often 'closely associated' with 
the more specific word hsing [xingl, undoubtedly meaning 'punishment' 
or 'penal law."' He follows this denial by turning his attention to 
rather than fastandards.Then the possibility metamorphoses 
into settled fact, which Schwartz combines with another possibility: 
"With the rise of Legalism, with its orientation toward the forcible imposi- 
tion not only of penal law but of institutional models of all sorts, it is 
possible that the coercive connotation of the word fa is very much 
re in for~ed."~~ 
Schwartz' presentation confuses the substantive task of showing that 
a meaning change actually took place with the conceptual task of show- 
ing that it was possible. Of course any symbol may bear any possible 
meaning; the question is whether the community's use actualized one 
particular semantic possibility. He allows that, for many texts, "a good 
case can be made" that law is a misleading translation. I have argued 
that what he must show is that for at least some texts the law translation 
clarifies or improves the account of the views in text. The improve- 
ment must outweigh the implicit cost of claiming a breakdown in 
communication. 
We may understand Schwartz differently. He may not be arguing for 
the meaning change as much as maintaining that the onus lies with 
those who challenge the existing translation-interpretation practice. 
Thus, he good-naturedly teases Creel for his protective attitude toward 
Shen Buhai, whom tradition normally considers a Legalist. Still, when 
both Schwartz and Creel talk about Shang Yang and Han Feizi, they 
agree that the proper translation is 'law'. They agree on that, and they 
agree that the latter advocates a political view which is similar to classical 
Western legal positivism. Creel said that Shen Buhai was not a Legalist 
because he did not talk about fa in the sense of law. 
As we saw, the argument for this "observation" is that Shen Buhai 
does not advocate a positive rule of law as much as a bureaucratic 
method. Schwartz retorts in the same spirit that "the system did not 
preclude capital punishment."ll This shows that both implicitly recognize 
that a character's sense in stating one belief depends on that belief's 
connection to other beliefs-specifically here about punishment and 
coercion. What we need from both is a clear statement of what connec-
tion between beliefs about punishment and fa warrants the conclusion 
that fa means law. If it does, then we attribute to Han Feizi the specific 
theory of law expressed in his statements about fa. We need constructive 
argument that the attributing of that theory of what we call'law' to him 
illuminates or explains his views on government, coercion, and punish- 
ment better than the theory of standards would. 
Craham lays the basis of my denial of the meaning-change hypothe- 
sis. He similarly gives a careful and detailed account of the early 'stan- 
dards' meaning, stressing the connection of fa and measurement. He 
explains the novelty of the Legalist position as lying only in repudiating 
the view that the fa require cultured gentlemen to use them.12 He then 
provides this exiguous motivation for clinging to the meaning-change 
hypothesis: "It is standards enforced by punishment (what for us is penal 
law) which get fully codified."13 He then concludes, "The scope of fa thus 
contracts towards what in Western terms is law." 
Graham's statement has this strength: it recognizes that the alleged 
meaning change requires that the range of conventional denotations 
must "contract." It must come to denote only a subset of its original 
range if the meaning change has occurred. Still, he does not acknowl- 
edge the obvious difficulty in showing that a range of denotation has 
shrunk. Plainly, a particular referential use, even if regular and consistent, 
cannot show that the denotation has shrunk. We can only show that by 
a denial of reference (or a "pattern" of avoiding use). Unless writers 
explicitly reject using the term to refer to part of the prior denotation, 
any reference will still be consistent with the null hypothesis. The mean- 
ing changes (contracts) only when it is conventionally unacceptable to 
use the word for anything other than a law. 
Especially puzzling, therefore, i s  that Craham immediately takes the 
claim back. He continues in the same breath, "but even among those 
classed as Legalists it can include, for example, methods of regulating the 
bureaucracy." If it includes such things, then the scope does not con-
sistently contract. We again lack any reason to say the meaning has 
changed. Graham's way of conforming to the translation tradition re- 
quires that the same speaker use the term with alternately a narrow and 
a wide reference. The natural conclusion, since this alleged Legalist used 
the term with the entire traditional broad scope, is that fagandardsstill has 
the same meaning. 
The most promising start to a discussion of the meaning-change 
hypothesis among modern commentators is Roger Ames' The Art of 
Rulership.14Ames announces an intention to do something that would 
help relieve the burden. He offers to "discuss the evolution of fa from its 
primary meaning of 'model or standard' to the notion of 'penal law."' 
Between that statement and the exposition, however, Ames' focus shifts. 
His discussion neither proves that the meaning shift took place nor ex- 
plains why it did. 
What instead follows that optimistic beginning is Ames' using the 
translation orthodoxy in a different project-the study of the evolution 
of legal theory. He looks at changing beliefs rather than changing mean- Chad Hansen 
ings. He surveys classical Chinese doctrines about penal law relying on 
the meaning-change hypothesis to identify these doctrines.15 In the place 
of the promised proof or explanation, Ames states the traditional theory 
wrapped in a hydraulic metaphor. "Only well into the Warring States 
period when the Legalist theorists had taken over this character and 
injected it with their own meaning did it come to  connote 'penal law'" 
(italics mine). This metaphorical "explanation" (one envisions Han Feizi 
holding a syringe in one hand and the struggling character in the other) 
is not among the mechanisms we have identified for meaning change. 
And, beyond this, Ames neither explains how he identifies these different 
connotations nor attempts to justify the claim that they have changed.16 
So Ames, Craham, Schwartz, and Creel all take the meaning change 
as given, and read the texts on that assumption. None seriously enter- 
tains or experiments with denying it. No one tests the null hypothesis. 
Ames simply translates the character as 'standards' until he gets t o  Xunzi 
and conventionally recognized Legalists, and then he translates the term 
as 'laws'. As with Craham and Schwartz, any confidence in this transla- 
tion comes either from confidence in the tradition of change coupled 
with question-begging confidence that Han Feizi is a legal positivist. That 
confidence derives from the translation practice. 
IV. The Meaning of Law: Inferential Relations 
Although these presentations are inadequate, they do illustrate sev- 
eral important points. The exchange between Schwartz and Creel re- 
minds us that translation always involves two theories of meaning-one 
for the target language and one for the translating language. Can we say 
what kinds of connection to other concepts-punishment, coercion, 
rules, sentences, morality, rights, society-make some term a concept of 
law? Our task requires that we isolate some central ways the Western 
concept of law is related to  similar concepts. Let us review briefly these 
key inferential connections. We can, then, compare them with the terms 
of Chinese argumentation surrounding fa. 
A. Law and Laws: Sentential Form and Penal Content. We often forget 
that the Western term 'law' is not exclusively juridical. It has a primarily 
linguistic use. Laws are universal propositions (sentences) with either de- 
scriptive or prescriptive necessity (causation or obligation). Scientific laws 
are universal and necessary descriptive sentences. We routinely sub- 
divide prescriptive laws into moral, prudential, or penal laws. 
The more familiar traditional Western debate about the concept of 
law concerns mainly the status of coercively enforced, codified, prescrip- 
tive laws used by governments. These we isolate as human or penal law. 
A common conception informs the long historical controversies that 
theorists understood as defining law. Natural-law and positive-law 
theorists presented rival theories of what penal law was. They operated Philosophy East & West 
with the same term and assumed that, at most, one of their theories 
correctly captured that common meaning. The points of agreement 
and the reasoning both point to several key, recognized features of the 
meaning of 'law'. The central one is the formal point above-that laws 
are general propositions which create legal duties. They had different 
theories about why these were duties. 
The Western question took the form, "What distinguishing charac- 
teristic of penal law sets it apart from other obligatory universal state- 
ments? Austin's classical assumption is that law is a ruler's command 
which he makes obligatory simply by threatening a specific, retributive 
punishment for violating that command. It specifically denies the Natural 
law view of a continuum of legal and moral obligation. Natural law treats 
penal laws as simply the particular and localized adaptations of that 
natural moral law. Positive legal theories stress the flexibility of posited 
law in contrast with the immutable nature of divine or natural law. They 
further require a realistic requirement of effectiveness. For a legal system 
to be in force is for a government using that system to exercise effective 
control over a territory. 
8. Punishment.In most theories of penal law we find some argumentative 
link to retributive punishment. One possible inferential connection be- 
tween the two is that punishment i s  only justified retributively. That is, 
we punish only for violating a specific, publicly promulgated law-one 
that the violator could have known in advance. The theory justifying 
punishment may treat this as a logical feature of the social practice of 
legal retribution and then further justify the whole practice on utilitarian 
grounds. We may tie desert-linked public standards of conduct to either 
punishment or reward. If we associate them with a system of nonstate 
institutional rewards, such as promotion, tenure, or salary, we call them 
'standards'. If we tie them to a system of state imprisonment or execu- 
tion, we call them 'laws'. 
C. Publicity and Accessibility. Another feature of laws i s  their public 
accessibility and general application. The idea of law involves promulga- 
tion, publicity, and regularity. Natural law tries to solve the accessibility 
issue by appealing to the Aristotelian theory of universal access to rea- 
son. Law should be, in principle, something that those who are subject to 
punishment-the bulk of society-can know in advance. Formally The 
Law applies to everyone in the state. (Itmay apply to them, of course, by 
naming them as exempt from some laws.) We hesitate to call otherwise 
law-like systems "rule of law" when their administration fails to meet a 
minimal threshold of publicity, uniformity, and predictability. 
D. Authoritative Determination Decision Procedure. Public codes drag 
along a famous semantic puzzle. How do we successfully project the Chad Hansen 
denotation of a term from the cases we use in learning the word to the 
cases we meet in the future? Legal litigation typically takes the form: the 
law prohibits doing XI but mine is a case of doing Y, not X. A legal system 
with a fixed public code needs a workable solution to the problem 
of projection. Its defining solution is authoritative determination. We 
appoint people or panels to decide if the letter of the law applies to this 
person and her specific alleged action." 
Here one contrast of positive law and morality emerges. Morality 
does not have such an authoritative decision procedure. There is no fixed 
code; there are no performative moral authorities.18 In this contrast with 
law, we should distinguish morality proper from the accepted, positive 
group mores. General acceptance does not make mores moral. Advo- 
cacy by socially acclaimed sages does not make conventions right. This 
view of morality is central to Western ethical individualism. Individuals 
deserve fundamental respect as moral lawgivers. 
E. Morality, Rationality, and Legitimacy. The relation of law and morality 
is a controversial area of Western legal theory. Moral arguments for the 
rule of law are common. Some familiar derivations justify law based on 
prudence, utility, or individualism. The positivist tradition usually insists 
on a radical conceptual separation of law and morality. It regards law as 
an independent, amoral posit lifted to the realm of duty only by the 
threat of punishment. The two prescriptive systems are conceptually 
distinct, but the traditional Western theory inferentially links the term 
'law', like 'morality', to 'rationality'. Most obviously, our justification of 
legal duties and rights presupposes some normative claims about politi- 
cal legitimacy. 
We may appeal to ethical individualism to justify the ideal of the rule 
of law. The powers will punish people who displease them. The human 
thirst for vengeance is a fact about human nature and about power. Law 
is a protection to individuals, to rational agents, because it makes the 
punishment predictable. Rational agents can plan courses of action that 
insulate them from official coercion. With legal institutions, people will 
know how to act and avoid coercive force. Our actual legal systems, of 
course, only approximate that ideal. 
The important contrast is with rule o f  man, where the law is not 
specifically, clearly spelled out. Under rule of man, the authority decides 
based on his intuitive moral evaluation of you. That usually makes life 
more difficult for minorities, deviants, eccentrics, and women. West- 
erners regard any hint of rule of man as a criticism and evidence that 
the rule-of-law ideal has broken down. Again, when the system passes 
a threshold toward intuitive rule, we withhold the appellation 'rule of 
law'.Philosophy East & West 
V. The Chinese Conceptual Scheme 
That thin theory of the inferential connections in Western legal the- 
ory should give us enough basis to study the Chinese case more care- 
fully. There we will find many but not all of the elements. We will find 
them, however, distributed in different ways across the Chinese concep- 
tual map. 
One common feature we noted in the cases that scholars have 
offered for the law translation is the linking of fa and coercion or punish- 
ment. Graham, Ames, and Schwartz all agree that x i n g ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ " " " ~  JFlJoriginally
referred to penal codes, and argue that fa came to duplicate xing. The 
ruler-coercion link also grounds the identification with Western positive- 
law theory. Interpreters note, besides the ruler-punishment focus, the 
fa-jiastandardtzers Modern interpreters join Con- iE2hostility to Confucian liritua'. &% 
fucians in treating that as hostility to morality. We also will see a sugges- 
tive hint of a concern with public accessibility accompanying Chinese 
discussions of fa, which standard interpretations have largely ignored. 
What we will not find is the formal, general syntactic concept of a 
law. Commentators seldom address this absence of any evidence of a 
sentential conception, of any attention to generalized prescriptions.lg 
The translator may reply that the Chinese concept of law is different. 
That admission (made in English) is hard to distinguish from saying that 
they do not have a concept of law. Concepts are logical individuals. If it 
is a different concept, then it is not the concept of law. Should we say it 
is a similar concept-like saying that Liberace is similar to Rubenstein? 
Then we will surely want to spell out the terms of the similarities and the 
differences. If their concept of fa is not even of law-like linguistic struc- 
tures, then it is surely misleading to state that it means law. It will not do, 
in this situation, to say that 'law' is the closest term in English. 'Standard' 
is available and is the rival choice under discussion. It is an alternate 
translation that (unlike 'law', 'rule', and 'principle') need not entail its 
being a universally quantified sentential. 
A. The Confucian Argument against ~ i n g ~ " " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " ~ .Let us first address 
x;ngpunishment . confucius gives a famous argument against in 811 
the Analects (2.3).All the defenders of the orthodox meaning theory treat 
this argument as an argument concerning penal law.*O This raises two 
important points. First, there clearly are legal codes in China whether or 
not the conceptual scheme individuated them as we do laws. Second, 
there already was a word, which rival theorists took to refer 
to the codes. 
The theory of the meaning of x i n g ~ " " " ~ " ' ~ ~ ~is a familiar example of a 
meaning argument based on the composition of characters from sub- iY 
character units. The character is homophonous with xingShapeand uses Chad Hansen 
n 	 the same phonetic but with a daokntfesemantic radical rather than a 
feather radical. One popular theory is that the sense of the character 
incorporates the idea of carving, cutting, mutilating, or marking. We also 
find cutting off noses, ears, hands, and feet, as well as other marking 
techniques such as tattooing, to be common forms of punishment in 
early China. However, the same theory could equally serve to associate 
the character with the act of cutting or carving the codes themselves, 
that is, on bronze tripods or bamboo strips. The words of the code are 
themselves shapes. In either case, we will accept the implicit theory that 
x;npnishrnent refers to penal codes guiding punishment either qua them- 
selves being carved or qua carving or marking people. 
This regular use of x i n g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~blocks one of the mechanisms sup- 
porters might have appealed to in explaining the alleged meaning 
change. If they wanted to refer to official systems of coercion or punish- 
ment using a public code, they did not need to narrow an existing con- 
cept. Classical philosophers already had a perfectly workable term with 
precisely the required reference. Confucius also makes similar points 
& E using zheng-a character constructed of the homonym meaning to 
rectify plus a radical vaguely meaning to beat. Other available terms 
!% * , /;,,grders:commands, andused to describe official codes include zhiinstitUtions 
@ /"ordinances . SO, there is no conceptual gap the filling of which would have 
required someone to narrow the meaning of fa. 
Confucius uses a theory of names, not sentences. He certainly does 
not distinguish universal from particular or prescriptive from descriptive 
sentences. His question is "which body of discourse should we use in 
guiding social behavior?' not "how are penal universal prescriptions dif- 
ferent from other universal sentences!" The unit of discourse that inter- 
% 	 ests him is the minpme .So while xinpniShmentdenoted penal law, it did 
not have the same meaning-the same metaphysical structure. ('Fea- 
therless biped' denotes humans, but does not mean the same thing as 
'person'.) XinpniShmentplayed a different role in the network of inferences 
and available reasons a Chinese thinker would use in arguing for various 
social-political theories.*' 
In the West, despite wide differences in analysis and justifying the- 
ories, we assume we can justify the rule of law. Confucius argued with 
surprising vehemence against this style of coercive government and 
against its implicit analysis of the role of government.22 Punishment, he 
argued, gets social conformity at a cost. It undermines moral education 
and natural human development and dulls the inclination to spontane- 
ous social conformity-shame. 
Educational techniques achieve social conformity by reinforcing the 
social inclinations. Education, thus, leads to a stable, enduring solution 
because it relies on and exercises the social instincts. Official coercion, 
Philosophy East & West using laws and punishment, relies on, exercises, and therefore strength- 
ens self-interested calculation. Ultimately, therefore, coercive govern- 
ment is self-defeating. Mark Twain's comment captures the Daoist per- 
spective on this Confucian argument: "Soap and education are not as 
sudden as a massacre, but they are more deadly in the long run."23 
7. Public Guiding Discourse and Interpretation. The argument based 
on motivation combines with another traditional line of thought about 
X;ng~unishment, it focuses On Xing~u"ishment as a public, promulgated, carving. 
This ties ~ i n g p ~ " ' ~ ~ " ' ~ " 'to another inference relation characteristic of 'law'. 
Law is a fixed code that is public, open, and accessible to those we intend 
it to control. In some famous incidents in a traditional Confucian history, 
the Zuozhuan, Confucians criticize specifically the public promulgation 
of these codes.24 Their argument alleges that when the ordinary public 
knows what the xingpUnishment are, they will lose their fear of authority. 
Why? 
One possible reason is that if publicly accessible codes govern and 
control punishment, people can choose courses of behavior that assure 
freedom from punishment. The authorities will not punish them merely 
out of intuitive or moral disapproval. A linked reason might be that the 
framers of the code intended to produce an explicit code that the people 
could understand. It does not require interpretation by cliques of tradi- 
tional, esoteric priests who regularly chant and study the ancient and 
obscure lir'tua". @When officials feel like punishing them, explicit, easily 
ilnderstandable public codes give protection. They make it so that ordi- 
nary people can argue, against the authorities, that they have conformed 
to the code. Officials will become answerable; a simple, explicit, public 
code requires them to show that the alleged behavior really did violate 
the law. Coercion becomes harder to justify. "As soon as people know 
the grounds on which to conduct disputation, they will reject the liritua' 
and make their appeal to the written 
We distort this ancient Chinese analysis, I suggest, when we apply 
our sentential conceptual scheme and interpret it as rules, sentence, 
or truths. Confucius was talking about a scheme of guidance. Western 
thinkers do routinely segment guiding discourse into units-rules (pre-
scriptive sententials) or laws. Western tradition marks what it considers 
natural units of discourse ("complete" thoughts) with periods. 
The ancient Chinese thinkers, however, never characterized the lias 
rules, as oughts, or as prescriptive sentences. When Confucius (or his 
ghostwriters) analyzed the formal structure of guidance schemes, they 
found mingnames. So, he presented the interpretative project as rectifying $5 Z!$5 
names. 
The sages assign names to social ranks. (Rulers name people to these 
ranks.) These names determine which parts of lito use in guiding one's 
behavior. We act in accord with our rank and the rank of the "other." Chad Hansen 
We behave properly toward each other only if we correctly classify each 

E other. We must apply the name-rank-status apropos the liritua'cOde
and 
the situation. The whole code fits names into a hierarchical social 

scheme and people should fit into these slots. Breaking this scheme into 

units where Westerners put periods was not an explicit part of ancient 

Chinese philosophical grammar. 

The interpretative concern starts from the projection problem for 

words. As we saw, the form is "The code refers to X; how can one show 

that mine is not a case of Y rather than X?" The Analects discusses the 

projection problem in a passage that links it to both punishment and 

liritua1.26Rectifying names, according to this famous passage, would be the 
first measure Confucius would adopt if a ruler finally placed him in office 
(13.3).If we do not use names correctly, Confucius reasons, then we will 
misapply any form of guiding discourse. If authority does not rectify 
names, then lirl'""l will not flourish and x i n g - f a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ " ~will 
X I J 3  	 "miss the mark."28 This concern underlies Confucian worries about the 

rise of litigiousness, glibness, and cleverness-especially among people 

governed by published codes. 

2. Hyper-traditionalism, Morality, and Rule of Man. This second argu- 

ment, however, could become a minefield for Confucianism. Any formal- 

ized code is subject to interpretative dispute. The lirltua'is such a fixed 

code-though not cast on tripods. Confucius studied li in historical docu- 

ments and taught from a book of ti-like a book of etiquette. We thus 

call Confucius' teaching a 'positive morality' as we call law 'positive law'. 

So one can use the projection problem to criticize published codes 

only at the risk of threatening liritua'as much as law. The liritua',as the 

passage implicitly acknowledges, is also a code and is equally subject 

to performance interpretat i~n.~~ 
The li clearly led to disputes among 

Confucians about correct performance, about the degree of allowed 

deviation, about dealing with exigencies, and the borderline between 

names. 

There is one distinction that gave Confucians a reason to use liritua' 

while rejecting positive law. Using liritua'confined the interpretative dis- 

pute to the ranks of the priest class. Confucians thus attacked public 

codes for their very publicity and general accessibility. Only ritual spe- 

cialists-most notably those educated by Confucius and his intellectual 

heirs-could interpret the liritua'.
Only granting them that monopoly on 

interpretative authority could preserve their lofty status. 

The other key difference is that self-interest is not similarly exercized 

in using liritua'in the way it is in using xin$unishments.
The combination of 
promoting selfish processing and glibness in pursuit of self-interest is 
Philosophy East & West what makes public codes of punishment objectionable. Such public 
codes undermine what Confucians would consider natural hierarchical 
mechanisms of social control. The first objection is to punishment's ten- 
dency to induce and to exercise selfish heart-mind processing. The sec- 
ond is that a public, legal code invites the general population to quibble 
about which term in the code applies to them. 
The traditional story of Dengxi illustrates the outcome that worried 
Conf~c ians .~~Tradition claimed that Dengxi's clever legalistic arguments, 
designed to escape correction, confused shi-feith"-nOtthis.Penal law sys- 
tems reward clever disputation that exploits the inevitable loopholes and 
vagueness in any code. The constant need to fill these loopholes requires 
an equivalent cleverness. Specially trained disputers eventually will both 
write and interpret the laws. Given the tendency of law to strengthen 
self-interested calculation and weaken natural social instincts, the institu- 
tion creates a dynamic that feeds on itself and grows out of control. You 
eventually have libraries filled with laws, an army of lawyers, and jails 
overflowing, and you will still be insecure in your streets. Eventually even 
your political leaders will say, "What I did may have been immoral, but 
it was not illegal!" 
I call the two concerns about law the motivational concern and the 
interpretative concern. The interpretative concern requires the rectifica- 
tion of names so both li and xing can give reliable guidance to people. XI1 
This interpretative concern reminds us of still another aspect of the 
theory of law-authoritative determination. Confucian attitudes and 
inter& favor their being the interpretative authorities for all guiding 
discourse-moral or nonmoral. Adopting a nontraditional code under- 
mines the Confucian justification for giving special interpretative author- 
ity to traditional scholars-to Confucians. 
In my view, Confucius' claim does attack punishment, but he inter- 
estingly does not develop the interpretative argument by either attacking 
fastandardor using fa to deal with the interpretative issue. The two occur- 
rences of fa in the Analects do not illuminate his view of either the 
motivational or the interpretative issue. If he has an answer, it lies in his 
mysterious concept of renhuman't~-avirtue the authorities who rectify C 
names should possess. 
The interpretative concern focused on liritua'was one factor that 
pushed ~onfucianism toward an innatist or intuition-driven version of 
their theory-Mencian orthodoxy. We can interpret any guiding code 
into performance in many ways. Once we have formulated that worry, it 
will appear that we have to rely on something other than the code itself 
to settle which interpretative performance is correct. A traditional, code- 
based morality lacks something. An authoritative performance intuition 
is the Idealist wing's answer to that lack. It purports to settle interpre- 
tative disputes about whose performance correctly follows the code. The Chad Hansen 
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idealist view in China assigned this role to the mysterious term renhUman"y. 
It anchors the Confucian argument for the rule of man-substitution of 
the moral intuition of an elite class for explicit codes of behavior. 
B. Fa in the Mozi. We first notice focused philosophical use of the 
character fastandardsin the early anti-Confucian writers, in particular Mozi. 
Mozi used the term in a theory of interpretation that we can view as 
his proposed solution to the projection problem. Fameasurementstandardsare 
standards of language use that are accessible to people using only their 
eyes and ears. Mozi's approach to morality is via a revised guiding dis- 
course content and these interpretative standards. He does not worry 
about the truth of moral theory. His scheme, like Confucius', treated 
words, not sentences, as the crucial bearers of linguistic g~idance.~' 
measurement standards are guides to applying the words found in public guid- 
ing discourse. 
In general, Mozi applies fastandardsto language, but in particular he 
uses it for determining the linguistic content of the moral dao~"idin~di"O"rse. 
A dao is a bit of guiding literature. Mozi needs first a standard that 
determines what "language" to include in public literature. The tradi- 
tional code, he argues, is not necessarily right. We can justify a substi- 
tute, however, only if we have a standard to evaluate the traditional and 
the proposed new moral code together. Mozi's standard for selecting and 
interpreting the guiding code, the proper dao, is li-haibenefit-harm. This, he 
argues, is a natural (supracultural) linguistic distinction. It gives us mea-
surable access to an objective morality. "The natural will is like a com- 
pass to a wheelwright or a square to a carpenter." 
Thus Mozi's discussion of fa makes it more theory laden than mere 
'standards'. Fastandardsare publicly, objectively and naturally accessible, 
measurement-like standards. The prototype is a pair of contrasting terms. 
They are not, that is, rules-not universal sentential prescriptions. Mozi's 
appeal to fastandardscontrasts explicitly with the elite intuition standard 
that is implicit in the Confucian theory of traditional codes and their 
practical interpretation. Tradition is not a fa, because all traditional lan- 
guage is equally permissible and traditional codes are subject to interpre- 
tative dispute. 
~ ~ o b ~ e c t ~ v e s t a n d a r d sshould be reliably projectable standards for selecting 
some language and rejecting other language. Other paradigm fastandards 
were measurements (plumb line, sunrise gnomons, carpenter's square). 
Therefore, a code that is clear and openly published would fall in the 
range of denotation of fameasurementstandards. Mozi advocated applying the 
fastandards to the language used in x;~nishmentand inzhengadministration . This 
is not because fa means law, but because we should have codes that 
qualify as objective, measurable, public standards of behavior. 
I. Sentences and Guiding Terms. Mozi conceives of the debate be- 
tween daos mainly at the nameidistinction level. Still, he argues for a 
change in the entire code. Examining how he does this yields an interest- 
ing insight into the conceptual structure underlying moral debate in 
ancient China. We should, he argues, abandon the traditional liritualnd 
revise our conventional guiding discourse. Mozi proposes a new dao. 
A dao is a scheme of names designed to guide behavior. The core 
cases are Confucius' social-role terms, names of ritual objects, and action 
classifications. These all guide behavior via being programmed in people 
-input, as it were, in social discourse and informal education. We ana- 
lyze normal moral disagreement as cases where we apply names differ- 
ently in interpreting the guidance from these codes. Chinese philoso- 
phers focus on opposite terms and treat the projection problem as a 
problem of where to draw the distinction between X and not-X. The key 
to a disagreement, therefore, is b ~ a n ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. We differ in what we say is 
Sh,this.right and fe ;not th~.wrong 
, using any term. The use of a name to mark 
a distinction is the key step in applying moral guidance. 
Mozi proposes the li-haibenefit-harmdistinction as the standard to guide 
the interpretation of prescriptive language. He derives i t s  ability to guide 
the orderingof terms in a dao from its function of guiding the application 
of terms. He addresses, for example, the issue of whether public dao 
should include you-minghave'ateor wu-mingl"ckfate,you-shenhaves~iritsor wu-
Shenlackspirits. He treats the question of which of these strings should be in 
public discourse as calling for a projection-discrimination solution for 
YOU-WUhave-lack . This is knowing the dao of you-wuhavin~ack in~. T raditional 
accounts have misconstrued this feature of Mozi's thought. They have 
treated it as an argument justifying belief in spirits and skepticism about 
fate. Mozi puts these points as examples of the proper way to use the 
YOU-WUhav~ng-lackingd. tstinction in public guiding discourse. Making the dis- 
tinction correctly is using the terms next to other terms correctly. Thus 
biandist'nctionslie at the base of all moral reform including revisions in the 
content of public guiding discourse-the dao. 
Mozi's detailed theory mentions three fagandards appropriateof 
yanwords: language. ~h ey are primarily standards for the socially appropriate 
application of terms.32 In one of the three versions of the doctrine, the 
b;aognomon replacesfaobiect~vestandards.33 He repeatedly likens fa to mea- 
surement gauges-the plumb line, compass, and measuring stick. We 
can clearly link this notion of a measurement standard for the applica- 
tion of an instruction set to the verbal use of fa-to model, to emulate. 
One way to learn how to interpret a code in behavior is to emulate our 
parents or social leaders in their execution of the instructions. 
This use of fa to represent measurement-like standards is common in 
this early period. Rickett, for example, identifies the same focus in the Chad Hansen 
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doctrines attributed to Confucius' closest Legalist-minded contemporary, 
Cuanzi. The foot rule, marking line, compass and square, beam and 
weight, peck bushel, and grain leveler are fastandards.34 Cuanzi could and 
did, therefore, consistently advocate both liand fa. Confucius need not 
have been, and was not, critical of Cuanzi for his attitude. Fa could easily 
complement, and arguably was necessary to, any traditional guiding 
scheme of names. 
2. Standards and Moral Skepticism. Mozi rejected the li.He did so, 
however, not specifically on grounds of their vagueness but on moral 
grounds. Traditional codes may be morally wrong. To determine if they 
are moral, we must have a standard. Civen his philosophical grammar, 
the standard will be the standard of language-the dao of terms. The 
standard he proposed was altruistic utility-general application of the li- 
haibenefit-harm fails this moral test. It is wasteful for the distinction. The liritua' 
society and harmful to the people. 
Mozi's utilitarianism contrasts in an interesting way with that of 
Hume and Mill. He does not treat utility as the implicit standard of our 
existing morality-as an analysis of the meaning of moral. He proposes 
it instead as an explicit moral reform-a revision of conventional moral 
attitudes. He thinks we have a natural impulse to judge on li-haibenefit-harm 
grounds and he argues that the conventional Confucian morality should 
but does not meet that natural standard. 
Understood as a proposal for moral reform, for changing the public 
dao, Mozi's position has a familiar philosophical hurdle. Any attempt 
at moral reform proposes an alternative way to assign shithiS:"ght and 
fe;notthis: wrong
.Qua reform, the standard yields a different pattern of shi-fei 
than do our acquired traditional attitudes. A traditionalist instinctively 
regards that erroneous assignment as prima facie evidence that the re- 
form proposal is wrong. The reformer notes that this counterargument 
relies on the assumption that traditional moral attitudes are right, and 
thus begs the question. The traditionalist retorts that the reformer's argu- 
ments take his reform criterion for granted and, from the traditionalist's 
point of view, equally beg the question. This retort has even more bite 
against a Western utilitarianism. If the criterion does not yield outcomes 
we regard as moral, that is prima facie evidence that it is a bad analysis 
of the meaning of the word. 
In this standoff, the traditional scheme has another advantage. It 
normally includes thick moral concepts that we apply or project onto 
the world with studied social consistency. We lack strict rules for their 
use, but native speakers typically have learned to apply them intuitively 
in consistent ways. The reformer cannot rely on that scheme of shared 
guiding intuitions. His proposals must be more easily projectable if they 
are to give any guidance at all. It is probably no accident that moral 
revisionism in both traditions has been dominated by a standard that can 
be thought of as a calculus or a measurement. 
Mozi presents his proposal as analogous to measurement with a 
gauge, not as a calculus. Ordinary people can apply the standard with- 
out needing an educated intuition or intensive exposure to the tradition. 
The gauge guarantees that people will apply the standard in a constant 
or reliable way in guiding behavior. We can't expect ordinary people to 
perform lir'tua'correctly, but they can measure a board with a ruler, draw 
a perpendicular accurately with a square, and find a vertical with a 
plumb. The analogous, measurement-like utility standard should be 
equally easily to project. The people should need only their eyes and ears 
to apply it. 
Any moral reform requires such clear projectability before we can 
assess it. Still, as Zhuangzi delights in pointing out, mere projectability 
does not constitute a neutral ground for assessing moral reform pro- 
posals. Those who accept the utility standard think its outcomes are 
obviously right. Those who reject the basic standard think the outputs of 
utilitarian morality are obviously immoral. Given that the reform is less 
well entrenched in our acquired moral intuitions, the best we can hope 
for a moral reform is clarity, simplicity, and easy projectability. We can- 
not settle the question of its correctness without presupposing some- 
thing else. 
The Later Mohists continue to exploit this role of fa in their more 
elaborate semantic theories. A fastandard, they say, is that which, in being 
like it, a thing is thus. To describe a thing with a term is to compare it to 
a standard (A70, 71). Standards of similarity and difference determine the 
extent and limits of our commitments to apply words to things (A94-96). 
Thus fastandards crucial our andare to distinguishing dao~"'din~discOurse S 
guiding human behavior (A97-B1).35 
SO the original role of fasandards that we found in Mozi's thought is 
mirrored in the use Rickett found in the Guanzi and is refined by the 
analytical dialecticians. Fa are generally applicable to any guiding dis- 
course-from morality to ritual, crafts, and penal codes. Quite clearly, 
what we call laws-publicly promulgated codes-may be instances of 
such publicly accessible standards, and we could use fa in punishment 
and administration. But the notion is a quite general one of objective 
measurement standards. They guide guiding discourse. All explicit law 
could count as fa but 70t all fa is law. So fa means law in the remote 
sense that mammal means cat-it may be included in its range of 
denotation. 
VI. The Background of Han Feizi's Ethical Theory 
A. Daoist Skepticism. Daoist reaction to the Mohist-Confucian debate 
focuses on the insolubility of the paradox of moral reform. Mozi clearly Chad Hansen 
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hoped that the natural fastandard'of language would yield some objective 
dao, one that did not depend on acquired traditional or conventional 
moral attitudes. Laozi's analysis hinted at the claim that any dao based 
on language would presuppose some conventional standard. This, I sug-
gest, is part of what a denial that there is any constant dao implies. Laozi 
could be taken to explain away Mencius' innate moral-feeling structure. 
These are another result of our having learned conventional patterns of 
making distinctions and using them in guiding action. We can occupy 
no presuppositionless starting point. Hence, we can find no objective, 
natural, or constant dao. 
Another hope was that a standard would settle interpretative mat- 
ters-questions of where to distinguish between X and not-X. That hope, 
too, is dashed by Daoist analysis. Not only is it impossible to justify the 
choice of li-haibenefit-harmas the ur-standard against the rival Confucian 
traditional standards; even that standard raises its own problem of pro- 
jection interpretation. Should we count purely material well-being as 
benefit, or should we include moral development? We need a standard 
to tell us how to project the staridard, since it is itself a bit of language. 
Once we start down that road, it is not clear where it will end. Essentially, 
as Laozi argues, there is no constant dao because there are no constant 
names. 
Zhuangzi noted that appeals to intuition are circular and self- 
justifying. Anyone's interpretation will seem intuitively correct for him 
and those who share his perspective, and wrong for those who do not. 
This further undermines Mencius' appeal to a natural, instinctual moral 
intuition that happily turns out to coincide with traditional Confucian 
norms. Even the fool has a ruling heart-mind that shoots out shi and fei. 
A Confucian needs to appeal to something other than the built-in in- 
stinct of the heart to make a fool-sage distinction. An innatist must give 
some heart-independent reason to revere or model one's heart on the 
sage's heart. We need some standard to justify the claim that we ought 
to train the fool's heart to be like the sage's. The simple appeal to a 
natural, pan-human heart cannot justify such a choice. 
B. Xunzi's Conventionalism. Xunzi reacted to the Daoist critique by a 
converse strategy to turn the apparent Confucian weakness into a 
strength. Since nothing could work as a neutral critique of traditions, the 
only "real" standard of the correctness of action guiding language must 
be that tradition itself. Xunzi turns the historical conventionality of the 
liritua'into a decisive consideration in its favor. 
His best point in favor of this conservative moral conclusion lies in 
observing that the standard of correctness of language (names) is con- 
vention (tradition). Given that the question about the objectively correct 
dao has been construed as a question about the correct use of language, 
the answer is that the correct use is the conventional use. The correct 
dao is the conventional dao. The standard of correct interpretation of the 
traditional dao is also conventional. The correct interpretation is the 
living conventional interpretative tradition. 
The Confucian dao, therefore, is whatever the trained and cultured 
Confucian scholars say it is. It is the product of sithinking, not nature. The .F> 
sage kings started the tradition, and, Xunzi insists, it makes no sense to 
say, that someone used a word correctly without appealing to that en- 
during tradition of usage. So for Xunzi, the fastandard is the trained attitude 
of a traditional scholar-the j ~ n z i ~ ~ " " ~ " ~ " .  Z? 
Xunzi's use is, theoretically, the most radical deviation from the origi- 
nal theory of fa. Xunzi uses fastandardd' almost ironically. Since there can be 
no neutral, objective, purely measurement standards, the only possible 
standard can be the j ~ n z i g ~ ~ ' " " ~ ~  himself-his intuitions and behavior. 
The interpretative inclinations of the trained scholar are precisely what 
Mozi or Guanzi would have contrasted to fa. Mozi's original coinage 
specifically opposed Confucian intuition. Scholarly intuition is the oppo- 
site of objective, measurable, publicly accessible standards. 
C. Han Feizi's Amoral Authoritarianism. Han Feizi, himself a ruling noble, 
would hardly fail to notice that Xunzi's doctrine amounts to a plea for the 
authority of a scholar-elite. Allowing the code of lir"ua'to be the guiding 
dao of the society entails allowing the intuition of the scholar special 
authority. That authority, in Han Feizi's view, threatens to emasculate the 
ruler. Still, he accepted his teacher's assumption that if one accepts the 
traditional code as the guide to behavior, rule by scholars was the only 
allowable conclusion. His only recourse, thus, was to reject the authority 
of tradition. 
Authority, he argued (borrowing from Shendao), is a matter of situa- 
tional, chance positioning-not of moral excellence or other cosmic 
approval. From the moral point of view, as Shendao noted, it is an acci- 
dent who is the authority. Still, it is the person in authority who guides 
others in society. He does this because he has the power, charisma, and 
position to do it, not because he is an expert in the use or theory of 
language. The key power in the hands of a political authority lies in his 
control of the two handles-reward and punishment. 
Han Feizi's political theory simply accepts the authority of the king; 
it is not a theory of legitimacy. Beyond reducing the concept of legiti- 
macy to circumstance, his theory is not a moral or political philosophy. 
It i s  a strategy, addressed to the king, about how to preserve this power. 
In the power struggle, Han Feizi saw one main source of danger-and 
it was not the people. The threat to a ruler comes from the scholar- 
bureaucrat. The doctrine that made that scholar-bureaucrat powerful 
was his self-appointed role of directing public discourse. Chad Hansen 
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Confucians, especially, draw Han Feizi's' wrath. They seek power by 
claiming special access to the traditional code of rulers of the past. 
Applying their code, as Xunzi argued, required elite and esoteric schol- 
arly, historical knowledge of past literature. They manipulate kings with 
their erudition and mastery of these elaborate traditional systems dictat- 
ing a ruler's proper behavior. The king's survival depends on ignoring 
them. He must take the control of public discourse out of the hands of 
scholars. Thus he must be a reformer-not for reform's sake, but to 
prevent his power draining to experts in traditional discourse. 
He is also not a philosopher like Mozi. Han Feizi accepts the nihilistic 
conclusion that there is no natural, neutral, or constant guide for moral 
reform. Pragmatically, however, the state needs a single, coherent dis- 
course. Justifying i ts  content, beyond such pragmatic concerns, is neither 
necessary nor possible. Even raising the question invites philosophers to 
replace historical-literature experts in the power structure. All the ruler 
should do is arbitrarily identify one clear body of guiding discourse and 
reject all rivals and all philosophical biand'stinct'On-d's~ute.He forbids both 
disputation about what that guiding discourse should be as well as any 
identification with past discourse. Both threaten to transfer authority 
from the ruler to the scholarly bureaucracy-the advisors. 
In the Han Feizi, thus, we do get a familiar aspect of legal positiv- 
ism-a specific and strongly stated antagonism to liritua' Hanand yimOra'it~. 
Feizi formulates this as an opposition between liand fa, but we can now 
see that the familiar opposition has a quite different explanation. He is 
not a legal positivist with the familiar Western views about the separation 
of law and morality. His is simply the next stage in the dialectic leading 
from Confucius to Mozi, the Daoists, and his own Confucian mentor- 
Xunzi. 
Han Feizi draws some comfort for his amoral realism from D a o i ~ m . ~ ~  
The key Daoist point is that we cannot fix the standards of discourse 
without begging the question. Moral dispute has no objective solution. In 
place of the Daoist's tolerance of ambiguity, however, he has a Con- 
fucian's (and ruler's) fear of anarchy. He concludes that a focus on philo- 
sophical morality leads to relativism, skepticism, and, therefore, dis- 
order.37 Best to dispense with such talk and stick to clear, public standards 
of behavior-even if they are arbitrary. Given the ruler's position and 
perspective, he can and should adopt and enforce an expedient guiding 
discourse. He does not need any claims of sage-like moral virtue. 
His opposition to lithis antagonism to moral and semantic debate, 
and his fondness for the promulgations of the ruler do not signal that Han 
Feizi has changed fa's meaning. There are parallels between the Western 
debate and the debate going on in China in Han Feizi's time. They are, 
however, different debates. Alleging that Han Feizi has inexplicably 
joined a remote Western debate does not make his position any clearer. 
Han Feizi does not make fa refer only to sentential prescriptions backed 
up by punishment. We hardly need to make this assumption to explain 
his reasoning. 
We can motivate his theory using the concept of objective stan- 
dards of language use. He relies on the basic point Mozi first made about 
the concept. He joins the pre-Xunzi theorists in opposing fa to an elite's 
intuition. He opposes any code of conduct that drags such a nonobjec- 
tive standard in its wake. This is not because he has a philosopher's 
concern with answering ultimate questions. Disputation about standards 
invites philosophers and scholars into the circle of influence. He opposes 
philosophy and intends this to abolish it. 
On the present analysis, what happened in ancient China is this. Han 
Feizi, still a Xunzi-like authoritarian, splits with Xunzi (the Confucians) on 
one issue. They otherwise both agree that we need some way to solve 
the problem of interpretative or justification standards. Han Feizi rejects 
Xunzi's solution. It erodes the original point of fa. Conventionally culti- 
vated intuition is not in the spirit of fa. Any code that requires such an 
intuitive or esoterically educated standard of interpretation is also not a 
fa. We should only call a publicly accessible code with clear measure- 
ment-like connections to punishment and reward fa. Thus fastandardsis  not 
the name of the ruler-generated code, but of the underlying ideal of 
measurement-like explicitness. Only that feature justifies adopting such 
an explicit code rather than the traditional code. A look at fa jiaStandardiErs 
theory, from Guanzi and Shangyang to Han Feizi, confirms that all of 
them thought of fa as important in reward, advancement, appointment, 
and job evaluation, as much as in guiding punishment. Han Feizi 
and Xunzi do perfectly agree on the appropriateness of draconian 
punishment; they are equally enthusiastic about physically mutilating 
and crippling those they judge to be miscreants. 
The semantic point, in conclusion, is that Chinese thinkers come to 
see penal codes as instances of fa. That result does not justify saying fa's 
meaning changed. They can cite the fact that published codes are fa in 
their reasoning, using the prior meaning of fameasurementstandards. I  ll this 
evolution of political and moral theory, no one in the Chinese tradition 
had developed a notion of either a sentence or a sentence in universal 
law-like form. In that key respect, they simply do not use any counterpart 
of our formal, syntactic notion of law. They, however, clearly already had 
terms for promulgated codes of behavior-and it is Fanot fastandards. 
are mainly required to interpret these codes. But Mohist and especially 
Daoist analyses have led to skepticism that we can separate discourse 
and interpretative standards. The standards are merely more discourse 
that guide behavior-including speech and evaluative behavior. Thus 
public discourse is now regarded as fa-as the measurement-like stan- 
dard guiding behavior in general. Chad Hansen 
471 
g +g$d a- 9~ 
g $3 $$ 
~& 
Philosophy East & West 
VII. Han Feizi's Use of Fagandards 
A. No Clear Commitment to Rule of Law. Han Feizi's success as a writer 
probably owes more to his rich stories than to his reasoning. A random 
selection of Han Feizi's numerous stories reveals very little of anything we 
would recognize as a principled commitment to something resembling 
the rule of law. On the contrary, a typical range of stories describes rulers 
executing people for simply passing water or advocating Daoism. Neither 
the ruler nor the narrative cites any law, any stipulated punishment, any 
basis for the legitimacy of the ruler's arbitrary whim. Other stories de- 
scribe a king's angrily ordering the instantaneous amputation of his 
beautiful concubine's nose when she offends him by wincing at his bad 
breath and body odor. He holds no trial, cites no law, appeals to no 
prescribed punishment. The punishments are executed on the spot with 
relish and at the ruler's whim. Han Feizi cites these cases with apparent 
respect and approval.38 
These stories do clearly illustrate Han Feizi's approval of draconian 
punishment in enforcing and enhancing the ruler's otherwise arbitrary, 
accidental occupation of a position of authority. This celebration of frz- 
quent resort to cruel punishment is what our commentators have con- 
fused with a commitment to rule of law. It is, of course, precisely the 
opposite. It is the familiar Confucian assumption of special authority 
narrowed to a class of one instead of merely to the privileged, educated 
adviser-bureaucrats. It is a paradigm case of the arbitrary, intuitive, un- 
answerable rule of man. These stories illustrate nothing better than Han 
Feizi's theoretical identification with the interests, whims, and point of 
view of the ruler. His theory of fa is motivated almost totally from the 
ruler's point of view. Very occasionally he gives general moral arguments 
or considerations drawn from some broader social perspective, but these 
are sporadic slips in his rhetorical strategy. 
8. The Dificulties of Language. By contrast, the key theoretical theme 
throughout the Han Feizi is the unreliability of language. Han Feizi moti- 
vates his stern attitude mainly by worries about interpretative or linguis- 
tic anarchy. He observes that traditional doctrines such as Confucianism 
and Mohism split into incompatible interpretative wings.39 He regards 
with horror the Daoist possibility of reversal of opposite^.^^ He says Con- 
fucians, Mohists, and other philosophers have twisted terms such as 
fenbenevolent y;morality
, 
and 1; becomes feiWrong.uti l i ty SO that shiright In a parallel 
way, people interpret status terms or role names in distorted ways. The 
result is that the world ends up praising and denigrating, he laments, the 
wrong kind of minister^.^' 
Han Feizi follows the tradition consummately in regularly justifying fa 
via its influence on yanlanguage, zh;knowledge
, 
and biandistinction-dispute
. 
H'IS reac-
I 
tion to the dialecticians clearly reflects the influence of Xunzi. The way to 
prevent biandi"inctiOn-disPutes The result of fa is a general  faOb~ectivestandards.
impact on the content of discourse and i t s  relation to action. "Thus, 
regarding people within the borders of the state, their language and 
conversation will be guided by fastandards, their behavior will be resolved 
into practical accompli~hrnent."~~ 
Language is particularly objectionable when in the mouths of philoso- 
phers, moralists, and analytic dialecticians. In the chapter titled Nan- 
yand~fficult-language , h e recites a long series of such analyses of how language 
gets distorted. He concludes that the basic problem lies in an essential 
feature of professional political discourse: one has to be a worthy or a 
sage to understand it properly.43 Further, he traces disorder to the toler- 
ance of rulers in allowing the existence of incompatible daos. There 
should be only one guiding discourse and one standard of interpreta- 
ti0r-1.~~We should publicize the words that the ruler shis and stop those 
that he fei~.4~ 
I. Interpretative Motivations. Han Feizi's analysis involves a theory of 
how the x,nheart-mind executes i t s  interpretative function. He denies that 
Xunzi's ideal of the empty and still heart is realistic. The heart-mind, he 
observes, inevitably calculates. Like Mozi, he regards the preference for 
liutility as natural-even inevitable, but it is not for neutral or universal 
utility. In i t s  interpretation, he insists, the heart inevitably skews the out- 
come to the perspective it occupies. Even parents calculate their own 
interests in raising children. As our perspective changes, as we adopt 
different roles and positions, we change our interpretation of appropriate 
conduct. This comes closer than anything in Xunzi or earlier to a theory 
of natural evil in the 
In particular, it is the nature of position that chenministers must com- 
pete with the ruler. They will interpret moral guidance, orders, the expec- 
tations of their office, and so forth in ways that benefit those in their 
position, with their name, their rank, and their status. The king must 
reduce the space for such intuitive, interpretative manipulation to its 
practical minimum. 
Ministers inevitably incline to interpretations that benefit their school 
or clique. The ruler thus needs measurement-like standards for dealing 
with appointment, promotion, and dismissal. The danger to the ruler 
specifically is that positional interest cliques will form among advisors 
who will recommend others from their clique. Thus the king cannot rely 
on words unless they are governed by clear, public, measurement-like 
standards. Han Feizi stresses the special importance of appointing and 
dismissing on objective, result-oriented standards. The ruler should avoid 
any other evaluation of worth especially of moral character-again in-
cluding even his own intuitive assessment. 
His theory of how to control language appeals regularly to the con- 
trastof public fameasurementstandards and s;quprivatetwistings s;yanprivatelanguage 
,andI 
s i x i n g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .The opposite of fa is not morality but partisan reason- 
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ing, subjective intuition, scholarly cliques, and interpretative traditiow4' 
His special target, therefore, is liritua',which he declares "empty sounds."48 
The scholar-bureaucrats who interpret it mold it to their own interest. 
Wherever liemerges, he says, there is profit. 
As Tang Jun-yi puts it, Han Feizi doesn't use fa to make people be 
good according to the world's antecedent idea of good. He uses fa to fix 
what is shi-fei. He cites Han Feizi's aphorism that the fa that prevents 
treachery first prevents it in the heart, then prevents it in language, and 
finally, prevents it in affairs.49 
Fa, thus, is not merely standards, but public, projectable, objective, 
constant, reliable standards of language use and interpretation. Accord- 
ingly, fa is conceptually independent of xingP"nishment . Legalists do disagree 
with Confucius (but not Xunzi) on punishment. They deny the psycholog- 
ical theory that underlies the Confucian strategy for educational social 
control. People are already skewed to favor their own position, and pun- 
ishment is necessary for motivation. That point, however, is argumenta-
tively separate from the dispute with Confucianism about standards. 
Standards are necessary for the clarity and reliability of all forms of 
social guidance.50 Standardizers see the interpretative problem but reject 
the special, pleading Confucian solution to it. Their objection to Con- 
fucian standards is that they are intuitive, accessible only to the edu- 
cated elite, and too malleable to their partisan purposes. They are neither 
objective nor measurable, and, worst, they undercut the king's authority. 
The measurement standards must neutralize the heart's intuitive ability 
to skew words and language in i t s  calculations and interpretation. 
2. Fraud and Deceit. The ruler cannot even rely on his own reactions 
to situations in making his judgments. Clever ministers can dazzle the 
ruler with their erudition and manipulate him using his own biases. To 
prevent this, even the ruler must be guided by unskewable fastandards. The
standards, therefore, cannot be merely his desires or whims. They must 
yield some measureable good to whoever occupies the role of ruler or 
some good to the state. The fa, thus, are not merely the ruler's desires, 
published and backed by punishment. They are measurements that 
allow the ruler himself to avoid the trap of interpretative subjectivity and 
the word-anarchy that allows ministers to deceive him about their worth. 
Han Feizi quite frequently proclaims that fa prevent the ministers 
from deceiving the ruler. "If one has regulations based on measurement 
standards and criteria and apply these to the mass of ministers, then that 
ruler cannot be duped by cunning and fraud."51 Patently, laws, by them- 
selves, cannot keep advisors from fooling or deceiving their ruler. No 
obvious inferential connection runs between the rule of law and being 
able to deceive the kings2 Laws, as Chinese tradition understood from 
the beginning, are themselves subject to interpretative glibness. What 
insulates a ruler from duplicity is measurable standards against which to 
weigh their words. 
The purpose of fa is to deal with the confusion and doubt engen- 
dered by interpretative anarchy. The ruler needs fa, Han Feizi argues, to 
clarify distinctions in the relation of ruler and minister.53 If fastandardswere 
simply laws, it would hardly explain this role of fa in Han Feizi's scheme. 
The null hypothesis not only can explain it, it explains it better. 
Schwartz accurately identifies what he calls the fundamental issue 
dividing these two schools. Legalism stands for "a vision of society in 
which 'objective' mechanisms of 'behavioral' control become automatic 
instruments for achieving well-defined socio-political goals." This is cor-
rect. It shows that retributive legal constructs are only one aspect of the 
strategy of using fa. Graham, too, gets close to an important point when 
he says that Legalism diverges from Confucianism on whether the fa can 
work "of themselves." I take this to involve the Legalist claim that fa 
should work without scholarly intuition and authority. 
If that is correct, then the Confucian li is in one respect surprisingly 
more like our concept of law than is Han Feizi's fa. Mohists and Legalists 
intend fa to work without authoritative decision making. Fa should be 
mechanical-self-interpreting. There are people whose job is to explain 
the fa to people, but not to determine if the fa apply to this case or not. 
The fa are the standards ministers should use to  make that kind of 
determination. In theory, fastandards should not themselves raise any inter- 
pretative problem. The Confucian (Xunzi) position is that liritua'should 
guide society, and interpreting that requires scholarly intuition. Culti- 
vated, scholarly intuition is the only fa. 
The choice is between guiding human behavior using (a) measurement- 
like standards that anyone can apply using their eyes and ears and (b) a 
code that requires the intuition of the scholarly elite. Fameasurementstandards 
carves the issues differently from the way the Western debate did. On the 
one hand, Mohists and Standardizers stand against the intuitive preten- 
sions behind the rule of man. On the other hand, they reject the use of 
authoritative determination as a decision procedure for fa. The fa are a 
self-administering decision procedure. They are measurable, published, 
and accessible and are intended to guide ordinary people directly. 
What is called "wisdom" consists of subtle and unfathomable doctrines. Such 

subtle and unfathomable doctrines are difficult even for men of highest intel- 

ligence to understand. If what men of highest intelligence find to be difficult 

to understand is used to become fastandard
for the people, the people will find 

them impossible to ~nderstand.~~ 

C The Struggle between the Ruler and His Ministers. Han Feizi obviously 
assumes that the danger to the ruler comes from the high ministers, not 
from the people. He is obsessed with how ministers can (1) come to Chad Hansen 
control a ruler and (2)borrow and eventually drain his power. Commen- 
$7 	 tators recognize that interest especially in their accounts of shustatecrah, 

and they note correctly Han Feizi's insistence that shu will not work 

without faobjectivestandards.
Yet, mesmerized by their assumption that fa are 
draconian laws, we continue to treat fa as designed to control the ordi- 
nary people. Treating fa as law blocks a satisfactory account of the 
reasoning link between fa and the control of high ministers. I have argued 
above that it provides no appropriate reasoning link between fa and 
preventing deception, fraud, and other language-based ways that minis- 
ters control the ruler.55 Here the identification distorts the natural theo- 
retical relations of the famous doctrine of x i n g - m i n g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ p ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .  
f lJ Q The doctrine of xing-ming, like Confucius' original theory, treats sta- 

tus or institutional names as guiding behavior. In a telling case, Han Feizi 

shows how the term-based technique for controlling ministers works. A 

captain whose title was not dresser thoughtfully covered up the ruler 

while he slept. Both the dresser and the well-meaning captain were 

punished for disordering names.56 Notice again that we find no citations 

of statutes, rules, or commands-but we can consider this an example 

of fa. The official has a name and there must be standards for interpreta- 

tion of that name in guiding his behavior. 

The point of the example is that the king punishes him although he 

intended the king's well-being. He did not stick to the fwmulated pattern 

of behavior signaled by his name. Fa, here, still represents noninterpre- 

tative standards for the application of names, not the ruler's desires. 

If, as indicate^,^' xing-min$u"ishment-name
the text is part of shumethodS, 

3 then this incident explains why cannot work without
shumethodS 
faobjectivestandardsfornameuse. 
I.Lack of a Retributive Theory of Punishment. In guiding the execu- 

tion of reward and punishment, Han Feizi's reasoning is invariably more 

utilitarian than retributive. He often talks about punishment-both as a 

way of getting the standards adopted and as an activity that we should 

guide using measurement standards. Still, he rarely directly links a spe- 

cific punishment as a matter of desert to instances of violation of a 

specific prohibition. He does not, that is, employ the normal, legalistic 

retributive instinct about the severity of punishment. He treats punish- 

ments and rewards as independent general strategies either for benefit- 

ting the ruler, for enhancing his power by instilling fear, or for achieving 

some more vague balance of good over evil actions. 

Han Feizi more frequently advocates making both punishment and 

reward unreasonably brutal than for making punishment rationally pro- 

portional to harm and responsibility. His arguments here are overwhelm- 

ingly consequentialist. Harsh punishments and rewards more effectively 

Philosophy East & West guarantee the desired outcome. "When rewards are generous then what 
[the ruler] desires to achieve will be speedily achieved; when penalties are 
severe, then what he desires to prohibit will be speedily ach ie~ed."~~ The 
goal of punishment, he tells us repeatedly, is to end punishment, not to 
restore some deserved moral balance. 
I do not dispute that Han Feizi approves of punishment; what is 
relevant are the details of the relation of a punishing attitude and fastandards. 
Mere fondness for mutilation cannot be evidence of a commitment to 
the rule of law. There must be some conception of punishment as a 
retributive response to violations of specific laws. Han Feizi does not 
justify punishment as retributive-as a direct consequence of breaking 
a specific law. His relish at stories of punishment counts more against 
than for the conclusion that he has a commitment to the rule of law. 
It does not support any case that fameasurementstandardsh s come to mean 
law. The most commonly given reason for thinking it does baldly begs 
the interpretative question in the now familiar way. 
Only the prior conviction that fa means law makes fa and punish-
mentgo hand in hand for Han Feizi. Otherwise, we would notice that talk 
about fastandardsfocuses on the projectable, measurable, nonintuitive 
nature of the standards used in all parts of the social guiding mecha- 
nism. We should apply fa in penal mechanisms as we do to all other 
guiding discourse. Han Feizi, however, does not conceptually limit fa 
to penal codes or to the application of punishment. 
2. Fa and the People. The hypothesis that fa is  law also gives 
an unsatisfying explanation of Han Feizi's and Shang Yang's joint claims 
that fa reduces punishment and pacifies the people. Treating fa as 
measurement-like standards for interpreting guiding codes does give an 
explanation of both. It does so especially when combined with the view 
that these statesmen intend the fa primarily to control the officials. Han 
Feizi argues, "The great ministers find the fastandardso ious and the little 
people dislike order."59 This suggests he directs control by fa primarily at 
the ministers, not at the people. 
Han Feizi credits Shang Yang with the development of fa as a tech- 
nique of rule. In the alleged fragments, Shang Yang justified the publicity 
condition for guiding discourse in an interesting way. It is surprisingly 
sympathetic to the people's point of view. "The multitude of people all 
know what to avoid and what to strive for; they will avoid calamity and 
strive for happiness, and so govern themsel~es."~ 
Shang Yang proposed an elaborate system to spread knowledge of 
fa. He puts the moral argument about as well as anyone could without 
appealing to some doctrine of individual rights. It reminds us of the flip 
side of the argument above that we saw earlier Confucians offer. "Cov- 
ernment officials and people who are desirous of knowing what the fa 
stipulates shall all address their inquiries to these fa officers, and they Chad Hansen 
shall in all such cases clearly tell them about the fa and mandates about 
which they wish to inquire." His stress on this point goes right to the 
heart of the Confucian scholar-official's access to privilege and power. 
"Since the officials well know that the people have knowledge of fa and 
orders, . . . they dare not treat the people contrary to the fa.. . .'I6' 
Shang Yang's position, therefore, is antibureaucracy, not antipeople. 
It is a precursor of Han Feizi's attack on the power of the advisers. 
7 Shen Buhai's shutechniqueslimit the ministers' influence on the ruler; Shang 
Yang's fa controls their power over the people. If they have to abide by 
measurement-like standards in punishing and rewarding, they cannot 
arbitrarily reward loyalty and punish political enemies. This disrupts one 
way they could build a power base. Han Feizi regards both techniques, 
therefore, as necessary for the ruler to preserve his power. 
Han Feizi, like Shang Yang, repeatedly alleges that fagandardswill re- 
duce punishments and eliminate the need for pardons. If fa simply means 
penal laws, then fa institutes punishment. We could hardly reduce pen- 
alties by setting up the institution that creates them. To make sense of 
this feature of the argument, we need only remember that x i n g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~'IS 
conceptually independent of fa. Then we can see that clear measure- 
ment standards, easily applied and widely known, will reduce punish- 
ments. People can accurately gauge what will bring the wrath of officials 
on their heads. Armed with that knowledge, they then can and will avoid 
it. They will choose to avoid punishment when they know clearly what 
will and will not bring it. If punishment is dependent on the moral intu- 
ition of a scholar-official, as Confucians hope, the people will have no 
reliable idea of how to avoid it. Severity of punishment without clear 
standards cannot help people evade punishment. 
Both Han Feizi and Shang Yang also consistently maintain that 
fastandardspacify people. Again, if fa means the practice of draconian pun- 
ishment, this would make no sense as a reason for fa. The regularity and 
predictability of the system, on the other hand, could pacify people. The 
fa gives them safety and protection against the officials. 
If we pick an elite cadre of professors of ethics and let them dish out 
punishnlent whenever they think we are bad, then anyone of a different 
class or type with different outlooks and attitudes than those professors 
will be unsafe. We have to curry favor with that class rather than follow 
clear guideposts. We never know when someone might slander us, or we 
might fall out of favor or incur their dislike in some other unpredictable 
way. If we assume that fa are not the source of punishment, but clear 
standards controlling them, the picture comes into focus. In being clear, 
measurable standards for the imposition of punishment, fa give the 
people a measure of protection against the arbitrary application of 
x i n g ~ ' ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Philosophy East & West . St '111, Han Feizi's celebration of punishment does not require 
their being fa. Conversely, his support for fa does not rely only on their 
use to guide only punishment. 
D. Evidence of the Broad Sense. Han Feizi's use of fa"andardsconfirms 
repeatedly what Graham said. Han Feizi uses fastandardsain broad 
sense. speaksof fadustandardmeasures. falingstandardorders fashustandardtechn~ques 
, I I 
fa/iangstandardmeasurements, and SO on. Of these, fa/ing"andardOrderswould argu- 
ably come closest to  denoting a class of the ruler's commands. That, 
however, simply confirms that fastandards,by itself, still has the wide sense. 
As we noticed, Han Feizi identifies Shang Yang as the source of his 
doctrine of fa. So, according to the causal historical theory of meaning, 
we treat him as intending to  use it of the artifacts Shang Yang did. 
Schwartz, too, accepts this identification and then clearly describes fa 
not as law but as a standardized program of social institutional change.62 
Penal law, he there allows, is merely a subclass of fa. 
Now, the question is, do the Legalists ever confine the use of fa 
specifically to penal laws? Some laws are clearly instances of fa. Still, once 
we understand the relation of meaning and reference, we have no reason 
to treat even the most explicit case of calling a direct statement of a law 
'fa' a case where the meaning has changed. Using fa to refer to a law or 
laws is not using 'fa' to  mean 'law'. 
One of the most cited cases to support the meaning-change hypoth- 
esis is Shang Yang's military promotion rule. Han Feizi cites approvingly 
as an example of fa a regulation that ties rank and salary increases 
specifically to the number of enemy heads cut off in battle.63 Notice two 
points about this frequently cited case. First i t  is a case of a reward, not 
a punishment. Second, the salient feature is not its law-like, sentential 
character or its being a command. What is important is its measure-
ment-like character. It does not require intuitive or moral evaluation to  
determine the size of the promotion. It applies with measurement-like 
objectivity. In this, Tang concludes correctly, Han Feizi and Shang 
Yang are "exactly following M o ~ i . " ~ ~  Neither narrows the meaning of 
faobject~vepubl~cstandards 
E. Semantic Summary. So we conclude that throughout the classical 
period, fa consistently means measurable, publicly accessible, standards 
for the application of terms used in behavior guidance. Daoist analysis 
shows that such standards of language are themselves examples of be- 
havior guiding language. Legal codes fall within the scope of reference of 
the term because legal codes are explicit, published, and accessible. Han 
Feizi and Shang Yang intend them to be as self-interpreting as measure- 
ments. They specifically exclude reliance on cultivated, elite intuition as 
a source of guidance. Far from showing that fa has changed i t s  meaning, 
this development conforms even better to the original meaning analysis. 
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Not only can the null hypothesis explain the text's reasoning, it makes it 
sound reasoning. 
I have argued that the full justification required of a meaning-change 
theory would be hard to supply. The crucial semantic point is this: wher- 
ever a translation yields a statement that is either true orintelligible when 
we translate fa as 'law', that statement also will be true or intelligible 
when the translation is 'standards'. Conversely, however, in many (proba- 
bly most) places throughout fa-jia'tandardi"rtexts, translating fa as 'law' 
produces sentences that are false or difficult to make sense of on their 
face. We must attribute implausible or supernatural beliefs about law to 
the writers to make them plausible. 
Objective, public, measurement-like standards for applying names 
can plausibly make it hard for clever ministers to  lie, for glib talkers to  
take people in with sophistries, prevent evil and deceit, prohibit error and 
prevent selfish motives, correct faults of superiors, expose error, check 
excess, and unify standard^.^^ How can laws achieve any of those out- 
comes? The supposed answer i s  we pass laws against such things and 
punish them. That solution, however, assumes that we have objective 
standards to  use in applying the laws. The answer, in other words, ignores 
the classical problem that drew everyone's attention from Confucius to 
Han Feizi-the difficulties of interpreting language. 
Semantically, nothing in Han Feizi's use could require us to  adopt the 
hypothesis that the meaning of the term fa has changed. The hypothesis 
fails to explain the persuasive force of any of his main arguments for fa. 
It, on the contrary, detracts from the persuasive force of most of them. It 
does not capture the inference potential of the character. Han Feizi does 
favor using punishment to  get the fa adopted. He favors punishment for 
motivating nearly all parts of his political program-as well as for anyone 
who wounds the king's sexual ego or otherwise ignores his instantaneous 
whims. Han Feizi's theoretical analysis of the political problem of ruler- 
ship is that people naturally incline to private interpretation. We have 
to guide and motivate shared, public standards. Han Feizi's theory of how 
to motivate the adoption of publicly promulgated standards does rely on 
the threat of punishment. Still, he shows depressingly minimal attach- 
ment to the rule of law and lacks any obvious appreciation of the retribu- 
tive link between law and punishment. That makes his bare fondness for 
and reliance on punishment irrelevant to the issue at hand. 
Rejecting the meaning-change hypothesis does little morally to reha- 
bilitate Han Feizi. (It perhaps does more to rehabilitate Shang Yang.) Han 
Feizi still does not become a democratic liberal or a kinder, gentler 
punisher. It does, however, clarify the nature and force of his reason- 
ing, separating him especially from Xunzi's Confucianism. The meaning- 
consistent hypothesis ties his views to  other assumptions permeating 
political-legal thought from Confucius and Mozi to the Daoists, the 
school of names, and Xunzi. Understanding Han Feizi requires no radical 
claim that he is speaking a different language or missing the point. There 
was communication between Xunzi and Han Feizi. Han Feizi opposed 
conventions and was against using the j ~ n z i ~ ~ " ~ " " ~ "as the interpretative 
standard. This position is utterly consistent with the normal, established, 
constant philosophical meaning of fa. 
NOTES 
1- Ames (1983, p. 228 n. 12), contrasts Zhuangzi's allegedly Natural 
Law theory with the Legalist's positivism. Schwartz treats the Legal- 
ists as social scientists (1985, p. 348), and Graham cites Schwartz 
with approval (1989, p. 269). Clearly there is a factor here of thinking 
of Legal Positivism as the rational or scientific view of laws. In princi- 
ple, we could take fa to mean law while treating theorists as Natural 
Law theorists or any other theory that we would count as a theory 
of law. 
2 - Hansen 1985 and also 1992, pp. 14-26, 35-53. 
3 - The purpose, as we noted above, may be flawed. Perhaps we should 
give it up. Or there may be some more scientifically respectable 
way to  achieve it. We  have avoided these questions, but only provi- 
sionally. We carry on the debate in the existing terms-for now. 
4 - As we noted above, the common MCH theories entail that the first 
Daoist or the first Legalist made an egregious error in his use of the 
term. If there is an existing meaning, the theorist cannot treat the 
second meaning as existing until the mistake becomes a common 
practice. Since the term has a preexisting meaning, the first use that 
deviates from it must be a mistake. The MCH theorist should ex- 
plain why the rest of the community did not detect and correct the 
mistake in the normal way. 
5 - In the present case, for example, I suspect that fa does change 
meaning when translators used it as one of the translations of 
dharma in Buddhism. This automatically imports a new set of con- 
ventional inferences to other concepts in Buddhist theory. I have 
not examined whether the general use of fa changed enough after 
the invasion of Buddhism to support the claim that it changed 
meaning in non-Buddhist use. If there is a comparative-advantage 
case for the claim that it did come to  mean law and if dharma is 
correctly or accurately translated as law, then this event could 
explain when and how fa changed meaning. Chad Hansen 
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6 -	Lauren Pfister (1991) has drawn attention to the use of some of 
these appeals in the early missionary justifications of their meaning 
hypothesis designed to show that Chinese were monotheists and 
had a word for God. 
7 - Hansen 1985. 
8 - Schwartz 1985, p. 321. 
9 - lbid., p. 322. 
10 - lbid., p. 323. 
11 - lbid., p. 338. 
12 -	Graham 1989, p. 275. Craham conforms to the orthodoxy in blam- 
ing Han Feizi for the meaning change. He treats the assumption that 
fa requires the moral intuition of the cultivated gentleman as the 
standard view which Han Feizi revises. I will argue below that it is 
only the view of Xunzi. We should not ignore the Mohist, Later 
Mohist, Daoist, and Guanzi uses in which they advocate fa precisely 
on the ground that ordinary people can apply them accurately and 
directly without needing extensive training or authority. 
13 -	Craham 1989, p. 275. As I will argue below, the implicit suggestion 
that Legalists use fa only of the standards of punishment rather than 
of reward is wrong. One of the most famous and most strictly 
formulated examples of fa is Shang Yang's scheme of reward and 
advancement discussed below. The conclusion that fa "contract" 
for this reason is an artifact of the decision to translate fa as "laws," 
not an empirical observation of its use in the texts. 
14 - Ames 1983, p. 108. 
15 -	That is, Ames uses the hypothesis that the character meant stan- 
dards at first and then meant law mainly to entitle him to identify 
which textual comments by different writers were about penal law. 
Before Xunzi, he identifies the attitude toward penal law by looking 
for what philosophers say about xingP"nishment z/-,engadministrationOr
After Xunzi, he identifies these doctrines by looking for what they 
say about fastandards.He might have intended this procedure indi- 
rectly to justify the usual translation practice by showing that it can 
make sense of the development of legal thought. But that would 
require that he compare the overall coherence of his account with 
one produced by the hypothesis that fa continued to mean stan-
dards. He says nothing about what doctrines would have been 
expressed on the assumption that fa still had i t s  original sense. 
16 -	He does, however, assure us that, on the basis of his own examina- 
tion of the uses in ail the classical texts, he drew the conclusion he Philosophy East & West 
announces. It is the details of that examination process that would 

have interested us here. And about that examination he says no 

more. He doesn't explain what principles guided his examination or 

how he justified his conclusion. 

17 -	We may call systems laws in the limiting case where the authorita- 
tive determination is by chance or divine intervention-trial by 
combat, survival, oracle, etc. 
18 -	There is no one, including Cod, who makes something morally right 
by saying "It is right." Moral laws, like scientific laws, are hypotheses 
tested by reason, subject to rational revision when they lead to 
unacceptable consequences. 
19 -	Graham (1989), Bodde (1981), and Needham (1954) address the issue 
of Natural Law and do find alleged counterparts, but the counter- 
parts are not descriptive, universal statements in anything resem- 
bling an axiomatic or law-like explanatory theory. They are simple 
assertions of natural regularities (~e '~ . . . ' ~ ' "used nominally). Nothing 

in Chinese thought much resembles the Western view of a ration- 

ally ordered universe describable by a kind of deductive system of 

explanatory law-like statements. 

20 -	I would prefer to  say "against penal law." Schwartz and Ames, 
among others, hold that Confucius actually favors punishment and 
that these are merely arguments about the lesser importance of 
laws relative to liritua'. 
21 -	For example, (a) it would not as freely invite a theory collapsing 
penal law into a natural pattern of regularities (descriptive laws); 
(b) arguments about the application of law to  different strata of 

society will be treated as policy arguments rather than arguments 

about the essential form of law; (c) since it would resist individua- 

tion, they would be less likely to treat punishment as linked retribu- 

tively to  particular laws; etc. 

22 -	As I noted above, some hold out against the dominant view that 
Confucius opposes punishment. I discuss these arguments in 
greater detail in Hansen 1992. 1 will not address them here. 
23 - "The Facts Concerning the Recent Resignation" [18671. 
24 - See Schwartz 1985, p. 327 
25 -	Translation adapted from Bodde and Morris, in Bodde 1981, p. 178. 
Ames disputes Bodde and Morris' contention that this passage re- 
flects Confucius' attitude and that this line is consistent with a 
similar passage which cites Confucius as criticizing making a code 
public. That passage focuses more emphatically on diminishing the Chad Hansen 
authority of the scholars. That less-detailed charge is clearly consis- 
tent with the elaboration I give above. It is especially so when 
combined with Confucius' frequent criticism of litigation, glibness, 
and contentiousness and the rectification-of-names theory dis-
cussed below. 
26 - Analects 13:3. 
27 - This is  a different fa from the one at issue. 
28 - Confucius says that if government does not rectify names, then 
language will not flow smoothly, social affairs will not come into 
effect, liritua'and yuemusicwill not flourish, punishments will miss the 
mark, and therefore people will not know how to govern hand and 
foot. 
29 -	This suggests, in favor of Ames' view, that Confucius cannot legiti-
mately have rejected punishment on this ground while still accept- 
ing li. He must face the interpretative problem in either case. See 
below for other possible differences that would account for Con- 
fucius' accepting li while rejecting xing"rOmu'~at'"l~unishmentcodes. 
30 - See Hsiao 1979, p. 368. 
31 - The central texts, here, are the opening sections of all three versions 
of the Fei Ming chapter. For more detailed interpretative arguments 
for these conclusions, see the discussion in Hansen 1985 and 1982. 
32 - For the detailed argument again, see Hansen 1985 and 1982. 
33 - Graham identifies biaognomenas a system of aligning posts used to 
mark, record, or calculate the position of the sun. See Graham 
1978, pp. 369-371. This reinforces the impression given by a remark 
found in the other two versions that trying to fix yan'""gUagewithout 
fa is like trying to fix the point of sunrise and sunset on a potter's 
wheel. 
34 - Rickett 1985, p. 128. 
35 - See Graham's discussion in Graham 1978, pp. 343-349. 
36 -	The connection of Daoism and Legalism is a complicated matter. 
The appeal here to Shendao and this Daoist point is only part of the 
story. For more, see Hansen 1992, pp. 204-209, 401 n. 12. 
37 -	This assumption that skepticism results in disorder is clearly a view 
he learned from his authoritarian Confucian mentor, Xunzi. Daoists 
are fond of suggesting (not proving) that relativism and skepticism 
would lead to tolerance and peace, not disorder and war. Another 
Daoist response, Zhuangzi's, is to wonder if disorder is so much 
worse than order anyway. It clearly depends on which order is the 
alternative.Philosophy East & West 
38 - W. K. Liao, Han Fei-Tzu: Works from the Chinese, vol. 2, pp. 11-18, 
"Inner Congeries of Sayings, Lower Series: Six Minutiae" (bk. 10). 
39 - Han Feizi, chap. 50, "Revealing Learning." 
40 - This point follows Tang (1975, p. 5071, who notes both a Zhuangzi 
and Xunzi antecedent for this attitude in Han Feizi. 
41 - This is the general point of the Liu-fanSixReversa'schapter 
42 - Han Feizi, chap. 49, "Five Vermin" (SBBY ed., 19:65). 
43 - Ibid., 1 :3: 9A. This statement of frustration echoes Xunzi, of course, 
and reinforces the suspicion that neither of them understood the 
analytic tradition. 
44 - Ibid., chap. 50, "Revealing Learning," (SBBY ed., 19:9B). 
45 - Ibid., 19 :10B. 
46 - Even here we should note, as we should in Zhuangzi's case, that 
this is not an argument about psychological egoism or individ-
ualism. Han Feizi describes distortion by positional role perspective, 
not from pure ego or self-interest. We calculate from our position, 
not necessarily from the fixed perspective of our rational, individu- 
alist ego. Tradition emphasizes the implicit rejection of Confucian- 
ism's family-to-politics analogy. I think it is  only a minor aspect of 
the argument here. 
47 - Rickett 1985, p. 236. 
48 - See Tang 1975, vol. 1, p. 509. 
49 - Ibid., p. 511. 
50 - Rickett 1985, p. 241. 
51 - Han Feizi, chap. 6, "Having Criteria" (SBBY ed., 2: 1B-2A). 
52 - One imagines a law being passed against deceiving the king. But if 
that is all that is involved in the technique, then this point would 
not figure in any central way in the justification of fa in general. The 
alleged benefit here is not a result of the system of relying on fa but 
the existence of a specific content in the rules. It is no more relevant 
to the system of laws than is any other random action that the laws 
might target for punishment. Further, the proposed rule will not 
technically prevent deceit-it will merely discourage it by punish- 
ing it if it is discovered. If deceit is successful, laws are useless 
against it. Whereas, if we think of fa as standards governing lan- 
guage use, the relationship claimed here is much more direct and 
relevant to preventing deceit itself. 
53 - Han Feizi, chap. 6, "Having Criteria" (SBBY ed., 2: 38). Chad Hansen 
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54 - Chan 1963, p. 259. 
55 -	Remember, I treat the explanation that says "you pass a law against 
it" as an unsatisfying explanation because that relies on some spe- 
cific content of laws rather than the rule of law as an institutional 
structure. 
56 - Tang 1975, vol. 1, p. 515. 
57 -	 andCommentators complain that the boundary between shumethodS 
fastandardsis not clear in the Han Feizi. This doctrine is particularly 
troubling because, on the standard interpretation, the relation of 
command and punishment should belong to the realm of fa. But 
Han Feizi seems to include it among shumethodSof controlling minis- 
ters. It counts in favor of the present interpretation that we can take 
Han Feizi's classification of the technique of x i n g - m i n g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~  
at face value and still understand why fa would be a necessary 
accompanying strategy. We need clear standards for the applica- 
tion of names before we can use the technique of punishing people 
for transgressing the boundaries of their names. 
58 - Hsiao 1979, p. 400. 
59 - Han Feizi, chap. 13, "Mr. Ho" (SBBY ed., 4: 11 B). 
60 -	Hsiao 1979, p. 399. Shang Yang is surprisingly more emphatic about 
taking the people's point of view in giving this argument than is Han 
Feizi. Han Feizi barely hints at this point and usually buries it in his 
broader argument that limiting the officials' arbitrary discretion pre- 
vents their getting control of the two handles of power-punishment 
and reward. 
61 -	Ibid. Notice that the text makes it clear that the fa are neither the 
l inedersnor the mingmandates,but the people have to know both for 
guidance in the State. The orders would be closer to the laws in our 
sense and the fa are the standards for interpreting them. 
62 - Schwartz 1985, pp. 331 -332. 
63 - Dingfa; see chap. 43 (17 :6b:9-11). 
64 - Tang 1975, vol. 1, p. 518. 
65 -	Chosen from Watson's translation of the things fa allegedly can 
accomplish (Watson 1964, pp. 14-16). 
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